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Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First It Hasn't
Succeeded, Try Federal Legislation
by
DAVID LAWRENCE DUNN*
In August of 1986, National Football League (NFL) players Bill
Bates and Jeff Rohrer of the Dallas Cowboys, Steve Wilson of the Den-
ver Broncos, and Anthony Dickerson of the Buffalo Bills filed a joint
civil suit against their former agent, Joe Courrege. The players claimed
that Courrege first wooed them by preaching Christian principles, and
then defrauded them by using fictitious names and bogus corporations to
complete fourteen shady real estate deals. The alleged total loss to the
four athletes was $200,000.1
At about the same time, rookie wide receiver Mike Sherrard, the
Dallas Cowboys' first round pick in the 1986 football draft, was not in
training camp even though his NFL teammates had been practicing for
several weeks and had journeyed to England to play an exhibition game.
Sherrard was "holding out" because the Cowboys and Leigh Steinberg,
his agent, had not yet agreed on the amount of Sherrard's compensation.2
During Sherrard's holdout, Steinberg conducted extensive contract nego-
tiations with not only the Cowboys, but also the now defunct United
States Football League's Arizona Outlaws.3 After missing almost five
weeks of training camp, Sherrard signed with Dallas. With the help of
agent Steinberg's skillful negotiations, Sherrard's contract with Dallas set
his compensation for the 1986 through 1989 NFL seasons at 1.408 mil-
lion dollars.4
In probably the most widely publicized agent scandal in history,
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. Player Versus Agent: A House Divided, SPORT, Aug. 1986, at 11-12.
2. Sherrard Agrees to Sign, Then Gets Right to Work Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 8,
1986, at Cl, col. 5 [hereinafter Sherrard Agrees].
3. Agent: Sherrard to Arizona Now a "Real Possibility," Dallas Times Herald, July 15,
1986, at D5, col. 1. To emphasize that the Outlaws might win the "bidding" for Sherrard,
Steinberg commented, "We aren't threatening anyone. But Dallas has lost interest in Mike.
Mike is sitting here and the silence is deafening." Id. at D5, col. 3.
4. Sherrard Agrees, supra note 2, at Cl, col. 5.
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Norby Walters and his associate, Lloyd Bloom, paid and signed college
athletes to agent representation contracts before their college eligibility
expired, thereby breaking rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (NCAA). 5 These early, financially induced signings rendered
players such as Ohio State receiver Chris Carter ineligible to continue
playing college football. 6 Moreover, the NFL had to hold a special, sup-
plementary draft in 1987 in which some of the "victims" of Walters and
Bloom-those who would have had another year of eligibility had they
not prematurely signed with Walters and Bloom--could be selected by
NFL teams. 7 Many other football players, including eight first round
draft choices from the 1986 draft, lost no eligibility but nevertheless were
coerced into breaking NCAA rules by these same agents' improprieties.8
These other players alleged that Walters and Bloom offered them drugs
and prostitutes as inducements to accept the agents' representation,9
threatened players and other agents with violence if an athlete-client
switched to another agent,' 0 carried out such violence against a competi-
tor agent's secretary," and participated in tax evasion.'
2
The roles played above by Courrege, Steinberg, Walters, and Bloom
exemplify the impact-whether beneficial or destructive--of sports
5. Walters has admitted paying college athletes up to $800,000 to sign representation
contracts before their eligibility ended. The Agents' Club: Just About Anyone Can Join, Gan-
nett Westchester Newspapers, Aug. 23, 1987, at D7, col. 1; see also Sex, Drugs Enter Probe of
Sports Agents, San Francisco Examiner, May 21, 1987, at G9, col. 2.
6. Carter received an interest-free $5,000 loan from Walters and Bloom plus a monthly
stipend for ten months. Star Wide Receiver is Caught in Possible End-Around Play, N.Y.
Times, July 23, 1987, Sec. B, at 5, col. 1.
7. The NFL supplemental draft was held August 28, 1987. Draft Raises Tough Ques-
tions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1987, Sec. 5, at 21, col. 5. Another agent, Jim Abernethy, prema-
turely signed college players to representation contracts before NCAA rules allow, costing
them the opportunity to continue playing college athletics. Former Sports Agent Charges Col-
lege Players Signed Contracts, USA Today, Dec. 16, 1987, at C9, col. 3. Abernethy was re-
cently found guilty of a misdemeanor tampering charge and found not guilty of commercial
bribery and deceptive trade law violations in an Opelika, Alabama court. Newswire, Los Ange-
les Times, March 2, 1988, at part 3, page 3, col. 5.
8. With the exception of Alabama basketball players Derrick McKey and Terry Cones,
all the athletes mentioned in connection with the Walters-Bloom scandal have been football
players. Sex, Drugs Enter Probe of Sports Agents, supra note 5, at G9, col. 2.
9. Id.
10. "Former Auburn running back Brent Fullwood said he told a federal grand jury in
Chicago that agent Lloyd Bloom lodged a death threat against George Kickliter, his current
agent .... Bloom made the statement regarding Kickliter after Fullwood severed ties with
Walters and Bloom." Fullwood Testifies Agent Threatened to Commit Murder, San Francisco
Examiner, July 15, 1987, at F7, col. 1; see Agents Find Their Methods Under Attack, USA
Today, June 22, 1987, at Cl, col. 1; see also Sports Agents' Ethics are on Trial, Chicago Trib-
une, May 26, 1987, at Fl, col. 3.
11. See F.B.L is Reported to be Investigating Threats by Agents, N.Y. Times, March 27,
1987, Sec. D, at 19, col. 5.
12. Athletes in Agent Probe May Face Jail Threat, San Jose Mercury News, May 20, 1987,
at E13, col. 1; see also Sports Agents' Ethics are on Trial, supra note 10, at Fl, col. 6.
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agents13 on the modem sports scene. Player agents were virtually un-
heard of twenty years ago. 14 Not too long ago, some professional sports
teams even refused to negotiate with agents,15 considering them personae
non grata.
16
Recent societal and economic developments, however, have ren-
dered this attitude toward sports agents obsolete and unrealistic. First,
the increased popularity of sports has manifested itself in a dramatic rise
in media coverage of athletic events. The advertising and other commer-
cial activities accompanying the media exposure have meant more reve-
nue for professional sports teams, and, accordingly, more demands from
athletes for a larger piece of the pie.17 Second, competition in the 1970s
and 1980s from new sports leagues against the established football, bas-
ketball, and hockey leagues resulted in increases in player salaries. 18 Fi-
nally, although traditionally players were forced either to play for the
team that chose them or not at all, recent arbitration decisions, lawsuits,
and the resulting league-wide collective bargaining agreements 19 have
given players the option of free agency as an alternative to accepting the
team owner's final offer.
20
Lawyers and businessmen, attracted by the multi-billion dollar
sports industry, have stepped in to help athletes take advantage of their
increased bargaining power and earning potential, thereby creating a
sports agent profession.2' Although minimum salary levels usually are
set by league collective bargaining agreements, the sports world's "star"
system complicates any calculation of a player's worth and skews any
generalization concerning player worth based on position or age. Sports
agents, via individual contract negotiations, fill the ever increasing gap
between the minimum salary set by collective bargaining and the ath-
13. An agent may be defined as "a person authorized by another to act on his account
and under his control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 comment e (1957). See
generally id § 10 ("Agency; Principal; Agent").
14. Sobel, The Regulation of Player Agents, 5 ENT. L. REP. 3, 4 (1984).
15. Id.
16. Inquiry into Professional Sports, 1976 Hearings Before the House Select Comm on
Professional Sports, Part One, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 308 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (testi-
mony of Martin Blackman, agent, on management interference with agent-player relations).
17. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 126 (1986). Advertisers
spend more than $100 million yearly to obtain commercial air time during sporting events.
Some athletes currently receive annual salaries of more than one million dollars to play profes-
sional sports. Id.
18. R. RuxiN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO AGENTs 15 (1983).
19. Id
20. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 17, at 124-25. Instead of
being trapped with one team by an option or reserve clause, a player can refuse to play with the
team when the term of his contract elapses, thereafter becoming a free agent who may negoti-
ate with other teams. Fearing the loss of their better players and recognizing their increased
bargaining power, the teams now agree to longer term, more lucrative contracts. Id at 125.
21. See id. at 126.
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lete's worth.22
The vast majority of athletes and team management now recognize
that an athlete should not negotiate his own contract, since most athletes
lack the necessary negotiation skills.23 A competent agent serves as a
"great equalizer" of bargaining power, ensuring against unfair, one-sided
contract negotiation between an experienced team official and a young
athlete in his teens or early twenties.24 Furthermore, although contract
negotiation is the most visible and, arguably, most important service
agents perform for their clients, an increasing number of agents and ath-
lete representation organizations now provide other services for the
athlete.2
5
In short, at their best, agents can protect and promote an athlete's
rights in order to keep "the player in a frame of mind where he can
perform best for himself and his team."'26 Unfortunately, agents have
also used their positions for purposes less beneficial to their player-cli-
ents. Although sport agents have played an increasingly larger role in
the protection of athletes' interests, some have misused this power, vio-
lating their fiduciary duty to their clients.
27
22. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS, FINAL REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1977) [hereinafter
REPORT].
23. S. GALLNER, PRO SPORTS: THE CONTRACT GAME 50 (1974).
24. Hearings, supra note 16, at 282 (testimony of Martin Blackman, agent); id. at 285
(testimony of Jerry Kapstein, agent). A provision in basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's
contract, allowing Jabbar to use the Inglewood Forum as he pleases one day per year, exempli-
fies this newfound equal bargaining power. R. RUXIN, supra note 18, at 16-17.
25. For examples of the possible services an agent may perform, see S. GALLNER, supra
note 23, at 66. If an agent "is the right kind . . . [h]e is a guide, a friend, consultant and
economic adviser and so on." Hearings, supra note 16, at 201 (testimony of Clarence Camp-
bell, president, National Hockey League). For instance, Irving Marks, who is New York Jets
defensive back Marty Lyons' "agent ... accountant... advisor... promoter ... and friend,"
pays Lyons' telephone bills, home mortgage, credit card payments and insurance premiums.
Marks also "prepares Lyons' tax returns, handles his endorsement deals and invests his money
in real estate, tax free bonds and annuities." Off-the-Field Movers and Shakers, Gannett West-
chester Newspapers, Aug. 23, 1987, at Dl, col. 4. In fact, many agents have begun to stress
their financial planning services more than their contract negotiation services. " 'In most
cases,' says H. Kent Stanner of the International Management Group, 'the difference between
the best possible negotiator in the world and a monkey is less than ten percent.' " Agents Find
Their Methods Under Attack supra note 10, at C2, col. 3. The broader scope and possible
change of emphasis of agent services have caused those seeking representation-such as Am-
brose Robinson, father of David Robinson, the most sought-after player in the 1987 National
Basketball Association draft-to feel less interested in the agent's negotiation skills and "more
interested in [his] marketing and investment [skills]." Id.
26. R. RUXIN, supra note 18, at 21 (quoting New York Yankee executive Cedric Tallis).
Consequently, the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on Professional
Sports conceded in 1976 that "player agents are now generally accepted as permanent, highly
visible, and at times positively beneficial element[s] in the sports labor relations process." RE-
PORT, supra note 22, at 70.
27. See REPORT, supra note 22, at 73-77.
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This Note first examines some of the more blatant agent transgres-
sions to illustrate the need for immediate, enforceable agent regulation.
The Note then discusses ineffective attempts to regulate agents, including
league rules and state statutes. Inadequacies and inconsistencies of such
regulations demonstrate the need for federal statutory regulation. The
Note then analyzes the Professional National Sports Agency Act of 1985,
the only federal regulatory proposal in this area that has been considered
by a congressional committee. Finally, this Note proposes federal legis-
lation that would integrate the best features of current regulations into a
more effective and enforceable package.
I. An Abundance of Abuse
The abuses of the sports agent-player relationship committed by
some agents have taken their toll on the sports agent profession's reputa-
tion. Witnesses testifying under oath before Congress in the mid-1970s
described agents as "[having] no feeling for integrity, [or] team loy-
alty."' 28 Furthermore, they were described as "the most destructive forces
in sports today,"' 29 and the prime cause of escalating operating costs,
which result in higher ticket prices.30 A high ranking college athletics
official has lamented "the increasing exploitation of prospective profes-
sional athletes at the high school and college levels by unscrupulous or
incompetent agents."31 Athletes look at sports agents and see "a lot of
underhanded guys out there."' 32 Even successful agents concede that
their livelihood is seen as a "sleazoid" 33 profession, composed mostly of
"slime,"'34 with an "overabundance of unqualified people taking the
quick route to the top dollar."
'35
Sports agent Richard Sorkin attempted to take the quick route to
wealth by using his client's money. With no contract negotiation experi-
ence, but the reputation of being "the greatest talker in the world,"
'3 6
Sorkin made the jump from sportswriter to sports agent in 1971, and by
28. Hearings, supra note 16, at 165 (testimony of Harrison Vickers, owner, Houston
Aeros).
29. IM
30. Id at 89 (testimony of Joseph Robbie, owner, Miami Dolphins).
31. R. RuxiN, supra note 18, at vii (quoting Wiles Hallock, executive director, Pacific-10
Conference).
32. Id. at 89 (quoting Rudy Tomjanovich, veteran professional basketball player).
33. How Leigh Steinberg Rises Above His 'Sleazoid Profession,' Bus. WK., Jan. 14, 1985,
at 62 (quoting agent Leigh Steinberg).
34. Agents Find Their Methods Under Attack, supra note 10, at Cl, col. 3 (quoting agent
Lloyd Bloom).
35. Telephone interview with agent Ron Shapiro (Sept. 29, 1986) [hereinafter Shapiro].
"[Saying you are a sports agent is] like saying you're a bank robber or a rapist." Agents Find
Their Methods UnderAttack, supra note 10, at Cl, col. 3 (quoting lawyer-agent David Falk).
36. Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and Ignoble Fall of Richard Sorkin, Pro's Agent,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, sec. 5, at 15, col. 3 (quoting a lawyer acquaintance of Sorkin).
July 1988]
1975 was earning $415,000 a year from representing more than fifty ath-
letes. 37 Sorkin's agency agreements with his athletes provided that the
players' paychecks would be sent directly to Sorkin.38 Despite having
work experience only in journalism and public relations, 39 and having
been dismissed from a previous job as a sportswriter for financial mis-
dealings with a horse jockey,4° Sorkin placed himself in charge of all of
the athletes' financial affairs, including paying bills and making invest-
ments. 41 A poor investor and a gambler, 42 Sorkin accumulated at least
$271,000 in stock market losses and $626,000 in gambling debts.4 3
Sorkin pleaded guilty to seven counts of grand larceny, 44 but the victim-
ized professional hockey and basketball players were unable to recover
much of their lost money. One athlete who was forced into bankruptcy
by Sorkin's actions stated that Sorkin " 'took every cent I had .... He's
ruined my life.' 45
In a similar misappropriation of funds case, accountant-turned-
sports agent Norman Young started an agency called Probus Manage-
ment, Inc. (Probus) to negotiate contracts and manage athletes' finances.
Clients soon found, however, "that their bills were not paid, promises of
off-season employment and endorsement contracts were not kept, and
phone calls of inquiry were unanswered. ' 46 When the National Football
League Players' Association (NFLPA) brought suit against Probus on
behalf of some of the agency's clients, investigation revealed that "Probus
had court judgments totalling hundreds of thousands of dollars against
them and that there were no discoverable assets."'47 Again, no court or-
der could return to the athletes their mismanaged money.
The more recent, and hauntingly similar, alleged actions of agent
37. Id. at 1, col. 2.
38. Id. at 15, col. 4. After deducting his fees, Sorkin was to pay the client's bills and keep
the remainder of the money in trust. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 15, col. 1.
41. Id. at 15, col. 4.
42. "Sorkin often bought $200,000 in stocks in a day and sold them a few days later.
Losses were frequent, but the fresh capital from the players' paychecks kept a balance." Id.
Moreover, "Sorkin bet as much as $100,000 a week on horses, baseball, and football." Id. at 1,
col. 4. He became "a desperate bet-maker and bet-taker whose trips to race tracks and trans-
actions with bookmakers came to rule his existence, a hectic fever that only ruin could allay."
Id. at 1, col. 3.
43. Id. at 15, col. 6.
44. See People v. Sorkin, No. 46429 (Nassau County, N.Y. Nov. 28, 1977), sentence
aff'd mem., 64 A.D.2d 680, 407 N.Y.S,2d 772 (1978).
45. Kennedy & Williamson, Money in Sports: For the Athlete How Much is Too High,
Part 2, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 24, 1978, at 48 (quoting Dennis Duval, former professional
basketball player).
46. REPORT, supra note 22, at 74.
47. Id. The National Football League Players' Association estimated that Probus' clients
collectively lost over $150,000. Id.
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Joe Courrege and others48 show that the misappropriation of athletes'
funds by sports agents is an unresolved problem. Many young athletes
from deprived backgrounds are finding the struggle to escape those be-
ginnings hindered by the inadequate financial representation of sports
agents. 4
9
Another pervasive form of agent abuse is the "buying" of athlete
representation by giving the young athlete money or other considera-
tion.5 0 Many agents contact college athletes who still have NCAA eligi-
bility5 l and give them money, automobiles, or other gifts to "tie the
player [to that] certain agent and make him feel obligated .... -52 For
example, a lawsuit brought by Detroit Lions defensive lineman Reggie
Rogers alleges that in early December of 1986, agent Norby Walters
"spread $5,000 in cash on the living room floor in Rogers' Sacramento
home in an effort to sign him."' 53 Former agent Mike Trope sees nothing
48. Courrege is by no means the only agent in recent years to have allegedly mishandled
an athlete-client's money. In May of 1987, for instance, then Los Angeles Rams running back
Eric Dickerson, claiming difficulty in paying his bills, filed a $12.5 million suit against Jack
Rodri and his personal management agency for investing Dickerson's funds without taking
Dickerson's financial obligations into consideration. Funds Mismanaged, Dickerson Suit Says,
San Jose Mercury News, May 20, 1987, at E12, col. 1. In another lawsuit for mismanagement
of funds, San Francisco Forty-Niner wide receiver Jerry Rice alleged that Sports Plus, Inc.
siphoned off ten times the agreed-upon fees and commissions and used Rice's money-which
by agreement was to go into a trust fund to be used only for investments-to promote the firm
to prospective athlete-clients. 49er Rice Sues Former Agent, San Francisco Chron., July 9,
1987, at 75, col. 1.
49. Telephone interview with Lloyd Shefsky, former President of the National Sports
Lawyers Association (Oct. 2, 1986) [hereinafter Shefsky]. 'Teenagers and kids in their early
twenties from culturally and financially deprived beginnings are reaching the culmination of
their dreams only to be jarred awake and back to those beginnings by incompetent and unethi-
cal agents." Id
50. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Moorad, agent (Oct. 22, 1986) [hereinafter
Moorad]. "Unfortunately, the competition of agents to get the top athletes is so intense that
the unscrupulous ones will provide the athlete with drugs, money, cars, women, or whatever
can convince the athlete to go with them." Id.
51. The rules of the NCAA forbid the practice of trading gifts for representation. See
NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1, reprinted in MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATH-
LETIC ASSOCIATION 7-52 (1987-88) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. Despite this prohibition
and similar prohibitions in other regulatory measures, the proffering of gifts is widely recog-
nized as a problem of epidemic proportions. Moorad, supra note 50; Shapiro, supra note 35;
Shefsky, supra note 49.
52. Hearings on LB 755 and LB 1226 Before the Nebraska Legislature Judiciary Conm.,
89th Leg., 2d Sess. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Nebraska Hearings] (testimony of Robert Devaney,
athletic director, University of Nebraska). "[Miany athletes are unsophisticated when it comes
to finance .... Everything's been taken care of for them. They're easy prey." Sports Agents'
Ethics are on Trial, supra note 10, at Fl, col. 3, F4, col. 5.
53. Player Files Suit Against Two Agents, San Francisco Chron;, May 8, 1987, at 97, col.
3. Rogers' suit also alleges that Walters fraudulently told Rogers the contract would be legal
under the NCAA rules. "Many agents try to get a 'hook' with clients," says Rogers' attorney,
Edward Vincent King, Jr. In this case the hook was money. "These people used manipula-
tion, and as a result Reggie Rogers was shoved around needlessly." Id Agent Jim Abernethy
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wrong with such conduct and stated, "If I talk to a player, and he needs
a thousand dollars, I've got the money to give him."'54  Administrators,
professional sports league union officials, and even some sports agents,
however, feel the popular gift-giving practice is to the athlete's detri-
ment. 55 Agent Ron Shapiro noted that "the kids are easily seduced by
pie-in-the-sky offers when they should be thinking of the realities of the
upcoming years."' 56 Despite attempts57 to stop agents from enticing
young athletes with material trinkets, this practice is commonplace.
58
Another claim made by some players and critics is that some agents
charge excessive fees for their services. A threshold type of abuse results
from the agent contracting for and receiving an unduly large percentage
of the athlete's compensation. 59 The less blatant but more common
abuse occurs when the agent receives his percentage of a contract up
front even though the contract, by its terms, does not guarantee that the
team will pay the athlete the full amount of the contract. If the athlete
does not receive the full amount of the contract, the agent may receive a
much greater percentage of the athlete's earnings than agreed upon in the
representation agreement. 6° In one case in which the athlete received
is another agent who has admitted giving money to entice athletes to sign representation
agreements. Agent: Players' Contract Had Bonuses of $175 to $1,100, USA Today, Dec. 16,
1987, at C9, col. 3. Abernethy's payments of up to $500,000 to five football players and two
basketball players in 1986 and 1987, included signing bonuses, holiday bonuses, incentive bo-
nuses, and disability insurance. Id.
54. Black, A Hard Look at Agents, Part I, SPORT, Dec. 1979, at 77. Trope feels that it is
not the agents but the "college coaches that have perpetrated this problem. It's the UCLA's
and the [U]SC's across the whole country that puts [sic] the players into classes that they don't
have to go to, give them season ticket buyers for thousands of thousands of dollars, and then
when they're held to be accountable it's the agent-well, he made a deal." California Sports:
Regulation of Player Agents, 1984: Interim Hearing on SB 11 Before the California Senate
Select Comm. on Licensed and Designated Sports, 1983-84 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. 44 (1984)
[hereinafter California Hearings] (testimony of Mike Trope, agent).
55. See California Hearings, supra note 54, at 4, 6 (testimony of Jeffrey Walsh, attorney);
id. at 9-10 (testimony of Gene Upshaw, executive director, National Football League Players'
Association); id. at 26 (testimony of David Meggyesy, director, Western Region, National
Football League Players' Association); Nebraska Hearings, supra note 52, at 4 (testimony of
Robert Devaney, athletic director, University of Nebraska).
56. Shapiro, supra note 35.
57. NCAA CONST. art. III, § l(a)(1), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 51, at 11,
207, 211.
58. Shapiro, supra note 35; Moorad, supra note 50; California Hearings, supra note 54, at
9-10 (testimony of Gene Upshaw, executive director, National Football League Players'
Association).
59. S. GALLNER, supra note 23, at 52. Some agents have charged up to one quarter of
the value of the athlete's contract. One agent who has negotiated contracts for professional
basketball players stated, "I dislike super-agents. They prey on unsuspecting black athletes
with ghetto backgrounds. Agents like that ought to be paid an hourly fee, not a percent-
age .... No one is worth 10 per cent of a player's earnings." Id.
60. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 17, at 130-31.
For example, there may be a serious problem if an athlete signs for $450,000 over
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only twenty-four percent of his full contract, the agent, by obtaining his
fee upfront, received twenty-one percent of the salary the player actually
received, a dramatic increase over the five percent called for in the repre-
sentation agreement. 61 Additionally, even when the athlete receives the
full amount of compensation agreed upon in his contract, an upfront col-
lection permits the agent unfairly to collect interest on the lump sum
payment amount.
A relatively small percentage of sports agents are responsible for the
abuses that have tarnished their profession's image.62 Although a
scrupulous agent can be tremendously valuable to a player, 63 the "over-
abundance of people purporting to be agents" 64 makes it "very difficult
for the players to know who is really qualified to do a job and who has
their best interests at heart. ' 65 Because of the massive amounts of money
involved, the prominence of sports in the United States, and the fact that
"easily-deceived kids are the usual victims" of agent abuse, 66 measures
ostensibly regulating sports agents have emerged from a variety of
sources.
Some measures have recognized that certification of agents, includ-
ing background checks and threshold qualification standards, would help
three years ($150,000 per year) with only the first year guaranteed, and for an addi-
tional signing bonus of $75,000. A problem arises when the player's agreement with
the agent fails to specify when the agent is to receive payment. If the agreement fails
to specify that the agent will be paid at the time the athlete actually receives money
from the club or team, the agent might claim an entitlement to the entire payment
upfront. The agent might assert upfront entitlement to five percent of the $75,000
and the $450,000 requiring the player to immediately pay $26,250 of the $75,000
bonus over to the agent. Furthermore, in the example used, if payment is made up
front on the $450,000, only $150,000 of which is guaranteed, the player may end up
paying the agent for negotiating a salary never received.
61. See Brown v. Woolf, 554 F. Supp. 1206, 1207-08 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
62. Nebraska Hearings, supra note 52, at 6 (testimony of Robert Devaney, athletic direc-
tor, University of Nebraska). "I'd say.., there are probably 10 to 15 percent who are perhaps
quite unscrupulous, and then there are another 10 to 15 percent who might also cut comers a
little .... "1Id.
63. Hearings, supra note 16, at 201 (testimony of Clarence Campbell, president, National
Hockey League).
64. Shapiro, supra note 35. Leigh Steinberg, a California-based agent who represents a
bevy of professional football players, believes that there are 10 times as many sports agents as
when he began representing athletes in 1975. The absurdity of the speed of the profession's
growth is exemplified by the feeling of many agents that "there are twice as many people
calling themselves agents--even though they have never negotiated a contract-as there are
pro athletes." Sports Agents'Ethics are on Trial, supra note 10, at Fl, col. 3, F4, col. 6. Norby
Walters, center of a scandal involving at least NCAA rule-breaking and at most assault, fraud,
and tax evasion, is one of the hundreds who have joined the burgeoning sports representation
field in the past decade. Id
65. Hearings, supra note 16, at 284 (testimony of Jack Mills, agent).
66. Shefsky, supra note 49.
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to prevent the rise of such incompetent agents as Richard Sorkin. Some
measures have attempted to guarantee victimized players economic rem-
edies for agent abuses. Other measures have attempted to protect the
young collegiate athlete from being swindled by gift-bearing agents. Still
others have tried to regulate the amount and the timing of the agent's fee
collection. As the next section will show, however, these measures do
not prevent the continuing abundance of abuse.
II. Regulatory Attempts
A. Non-Legislative Attempts
(1) The Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes (ARPA)
The ARPA, a nonprofit voluntary association comprised of agents
from all sports, was founded in 1978 to provide for "competent and hon-
est representation of professional athletes. '67 The ARPA consists of
more than 100 agents and other service-providers for professional ath-
letes, 68 and is the only self-regulating organization within the sports
agent profession. The ARPA President Richard Brinkman explained
that "it's good to have a group to provide organization to the industry so
that the profession presents a somewhat unified front. ' 69 The ARPA's
Code of Ethics contains five broad canons requiring integrity, compe-
tence, dignity, management responsibility, and confidentiality from
agents in the representation of their clients.70 Within these canons are
broad rules prohibiting such abuses as representation without "compe-
tence through training by education or experience in a particular area,"
'71
payments to amateur athletes to gain representation, 72 and excessive
fees.73 To achieve its goals of increased levels of competence and ethics
in the sports agent profession, the ARPA offers periodic seminars for its
members. 7
4
Unfortunately, three significant shortcomings of the organization
and its rules render the ARPA regulation ineffectual. First, the ARPA's
status as a voluntary organization means that the ARPA and its rules are
not binding on nonmembers. Since the ARPA cannot compel agents to
67. ASSOCIATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES, DIRECTORY
AND CODE OF ETHICS 1 (1985) [hereinafter ARPA CODE].
68. See id. at 11-28 (directory of membership).
69. Telephone interview with Richard Brinkman, President of ARPA (Sept. 25, 1986)
[hereinafter Brinkman]. "If enough of the better agents join ARPA, hopefully ARPA will be
recognized as an organization which all agents wishing to be successful must join. Until then,
ARPA provides a forum to discuss problems." Id.
70. ARPA CODE, supra note 67, at 3-8.
71. Id. Rule 1-103(A)(1).
72. Id. Rule 2-103, 2-105.
73. Id. Rule 2-104(B).
74. R. RUXIN, supra note 18, at 89-90.
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join the organization, agents prone to abuse can evade regulation simply
by not joining the association. 75 Second, the ARPA rules are too broad
to be a useful guide for governing specific agent conduct. The canons
and underlying rules were purposely designed to be "not overly burden-
some and therefore no problem for any ethical sports agent to follow."
'76
Since none of the provisions detail precisely what background or experi-
ence is required to work as an agent or what fee percentage is considered
excessive, determining whether a member has violated an ARPA regula-
tion is impractical and thus never has been attempted.77 Finally, even if
a finding of a violation were made, the ARPA has developed no enforce-
ment mechanism. 78 It is little wonder, then, that the ARPA's goal of
increased organization of the industry has not been fully realized. 79 As
one member conceded, the ARPA rules constitute "nonimpact-oriented
regulation." 80
(2) The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
By the mid-1970s, agent abuses led the NCAA, an unincorporated
association of almost 1000 members and the primary regulator of inter-
collegiate athletics,81 to promulgate regulations in an attempt to limit the
"likelihood of an unscrupulous agent preying on a talented young and
financially naive athlete."'82 The NCAA rules prohibit an athlete with
remaining NCAA eligibility from accepting gifts from agents83 or enter-
ing into representation contracts.8 4 Furthermore, a voluntary "Player
Agent Registration Plan" adopted by the NCAA in 1984 suggests that
75. "You [have] all the good people joining the organization and all the bad people out
there doing whatever they wanted." Sports Agents' Ethics are on Trial, supra note 10, at Fl,
col. 3 (quoting agent Michael Childers).
76. Brinknan, supra note 69. "The rules are supposed to represent only the first, general
step towards cleaning up the business." Id
77. The president of the ARPA has conceded that the ARPA does not allege or investi-
gate the improprieties of its members. Brinkman, supra note 69.
78. Agent Leigh Steinberg, vice-president of the ARPA, maintains that the ARPA "does
the best it can to speak out for a more ethical way of sports representation," but concedes that
"[ilt obviously doesn't have the power and muscle to police the field." Sports Agents' Ethics
are on Trial, Chicago Tribune, May 26, 1987, at Fl, col. 4.
79. Most of the top agents simply are not joining the ARPA. Of the first 28 players
picked in the 1986 National Football League draft, only five were represented by ARPA mem-
bers. ARPA CODE, supra note 67, at 11-28; 7 FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
(AFL-CIO), LAWDIBLE: A SPORTS LAW REPORTING SERVICE 1-4 (June 1986).
80. Shapiro, supra note 35.
81. See Dickerson & Chapman, Contract Law, Due Process and the NCAA, 5 J.C. & U.L.
107, 108 (1978).
82. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMrrH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 17, at 126.
83. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(a), (g)(5), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 51,
at 211.
84. See id § 1(c), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 51, at 10.
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agents should register with the NCAA.8 5 If the agent chooses to register,
he must disclose his educational and occupational background to the
NCAA and notify a college's athletic director before contacting either an
NCAA-eligible athlete of that college, or the athlete's coach, for pur-
poses of representing the athlete.86 By registering, the agent has his
name placed on a list of registered agents that is made available to
NCAA colleges. A registered agent is removed from the list if he (1) acts
to jeopardize the student-athlete's eligibility by signing a representation
contract with the athlete, or (2) fails to contact the college's athletic di-
rector before contacting a student-athlete or his coach.87
The application and effectiveness of the NCAA regulations are lim-
ited in several important respects. First, any purported NCAA regula-
tory control over agents attacks only a small portion of the sports agent
problem-the buying of athletes. By virtue of the NCAA's limited juris-
diction, the regulations can do nothing to reduce excessive fees or pro-
vide adequate agent-athlete dispute resolution with corresponding
economic remedies. Second, as with ARPA regulations,88 the voluntary
nature of NCAA agent regulations renders its regulatory effort toothless.
Agents not wishing to comply with NCAA rules simply will not register
with the organization. Significantly, nothing in the regulations forbids
student-athletes from talking to or ultimately hiring agents who are un-
registered or even "deregistered" because of a rule violation. The NCAA
list of voluntarily registered agents, therefore, appears to be a paper tiger
that in practice does little to publicly differentiate "good" and "bad"
agents or to stop the practice of "buying" athletes. Third, the NCAA's
sanctioning power is only effective over athletes and colleges, not over
agents. If the athlete accepts gifts or signs a representation contract he
can lose NCAA eligibility, thus eliminating his participation in intercol-
legiate events and subjecting his school to sanctions. 89 An agent, how-
ever, is able to escape unscathed, even though he also has violated the
NCAA regulations.90
Because of the limited scope, the voluntary nature, and lack of en-
85. Letter from the NCAA to "Individuals Acting in the Capacity of Player Agent"
(Sept. 11, 1985) (discussing "1985-1986 Player Agent Registration Program").
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
89. NCAA CONST. art. III, § l(a), (c), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 51, at
10. The effectiveness of NCAA's sanctioning power, even over member colleges may not be
very great. One commentator feels that "colleges are not deterred by the threat of disciplinary
measures because (1) the sanctions are usually minimal, and (2) a school will risk sanctions to
build up a lucrative sports program since even after NCAA discipline, the school will be better
off than if it had followed the rules. Clemson, sanctioned in the early 1980s but still sporting a
successful-though ill-gotten-program, is a case in point." Brinkman, supra note 69.
90. "We have jurisdiction over the schools and jurisdiction over the athletes, but the real
problem is the third party we can't control-the agents." Former Sports Agent Charges College
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forcement power against agents of the NCAA rules, it is no surprise that
agents scoff at the NCAA regulatory effort. "The rules are ridiculous
and they're not being followed by anybody," former agent Mike Trope
has stated. "Why should I honor the NCAA rules if I'm not even bound
by them?" 91 Other agents feel that "rules are rules and should be fol-
lowed, but this is one area that cries out for change."' 92 There is a general
consensus that the "NCAA rules should be revamped to become more
realistic and punish the people that do the harm. ' 93 In light of the lim-
ited application of the NCAA rules to the agents, and because agents
neglect any rules that do apply to them, the NCAA regulation represents
a very short step on the road to eliminating agent abuses.
(3) Players' Associations
a. National Football League Players' Association (NFLPA)
The NFLPA, the union to which most NFL players belong and
therefore the primary guardian of players' rights, instituted an extensive
agent regulation scheme in 1983.94 Prior to the plan's adoption, the
NFLPA had negotiated only a minimum salary standard and other basic
amenities for NFL players through collective bargaining. Under the
1983 plan, the NFLPA reserved the exclusive right for "the NFLPA or
its agent" to negotiate individual NFL players' contracts.95 Sports agents
were not put out of business, however, since they could become "agents"
of the NFLPA by becoming certified as NFLPA "Contract Advisors."
'96
To become certified to negotiate player contracts, a sports agent
must apply to the NFLPA, and, upon request, provide "all information
relevant to his or her qualifications to serve as a Contract Advisor," in-
cluding educational and occupational background, as well as member-
ship in business and professional associations.97 The NFLPA may deny
certification of an applicant if he has committed such acts as fraud, mis-
representation, embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, or theft; has
Players Signed Contracts, supra note 7, at C9, col. 3 (quoting NCAA administrator Rick
Evrard).
91. McLeese, A Whole New Ballgame for Lawyers, STUDENT LAw., Oct. 1980, at 40,46.
92. Shapiro, supra note 35.
93. Brinkman, supra note 69. "The NCAA needs to get into the eighties. The ethical
agents, the ones following the rules and not entering the bidding war for the athlete, are the
ones being hurt by the NCAA's lack of ability to solve the problem." Ia
94. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION, NFLPA REGULATIONS
GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS §§ 1-8 (1983) [hereinafter NFLPA REGULATIONS].
95. Id. at I (emphasis in original).
96. Id § 1, at 2.
97. Id § 5(A)(1), at 12. As of the beginning of the 1987 season, over 800 agents had been
certified to represent players. By agreement with the NFL Management Council, teams will
not negotiate with an agent who is not certified. The Agents' Club: Just About Anyone Can
Join, supra note 5, at D7, col. 1.
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made materially false or misleading statements; or has acted in any other
way that adversely affects his competence, credibility, or integrity. 98
Once certified as an NFLPA Contract Advisor, an agent must fol-
low NFLPA guidelines. The relevant rules include the following: (1) the
agent must use a "standard representation agreement" or similar form in
contracting with a player;99 (2) the percentage of the athlete's compensa-
tion that an agent may collect as a fee is limited; I°° (3) an agent may not
collect his fee until the player actually receives the compensation upon
which it is based;101 (4) the agent must attend annual NFLPA semi-
nars;10 2 (5) the agent may not "provid[e] or offer ... to provide anything
of significant value" to a player in exchange for a representation agree-
ment; 0 3 (6) the agent must comply fully with applicable state and federal
law; 1o4and (7) agents may not maintain financial interests in professional
sports teams.'0 5 An agent who violates these rules is subject to NFLPA
disciplinary actions, which include reprimands, fines, and suspension or
revocation of certification. 
0 6
The NFLPA's comprehensive regulations, therefore, provide more
tangible punishment for nonadherence by its members than the ARPA
or NCAA plans. Additionally, by requiring information on an appli-
cant's background and qualifications as part of the certification proce-
dure, 10 7 the NFLPA has installed an obstacle to agents with questionable
backgrounds, such as Richard Sorkin.' °8 By flatly prohibiting the agent
from providing anything of significant value to the player in return for
signing a representation agreement, the NFLPA rules also curtail the
agents' practice of showering gifts and money upon young athletes in an
effort to win them as clients.' °9 Moreover, a specific NFLPA provision
98. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 94, § 2(C)(2)-(4), at 5.
99. Id. § 4(A), Exhibit C, at C-1. Using the standardized form does provide the agent
with the benefit of being recognized as the exclusive agent for the athlete.
100. Id. § 4(C), at 8.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 5(A)(3), (6), at 13.
103. Id. § 5(C)(1), at 15.
104. Id. § 5(A)(4), at 13.
105. Id. § 5(B)(1), at 13.
106. Id. §§ 6-7, at 16-21. The NFLPA regulations prescribe procedural guidelines--com-
plaint, answer, discipline, appeal, arbitration-which must be followed. Most of the discipline
is handled by a three-person "Disciplinary Committee" composed of active or retired players.
The agent can appeal the action to an outside arbitrator.
107. As early as 1976, the NFLPA was developing a screening process for identifying good
and bad agents. "We found one agent getting a power of attorney over every player's salary he
represented who had been convicted and served time for forgery and a few other crimes. If we
can find out that information, most people wouldn't want that type of guy handling their
money." Hearings, supra note 16, at 239 (testimony of Ed Garvey, executive director,
NFLPA).
108. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
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curtails excessive fee collection resulting from agents charging high per-
centages or receiving fees before the player receives the corresponding
compensation.' 0 Thus, the NFLPA clearly confronts the traditional
hotbeds of agent abuse.
Although the NFLPA plan surpasses its ARPA and NCAA coun-
terparts in curbing abuse, the NFLPA regulations still suffer from several
drawbacks. The plan's most crippling limitation is that, because athletes
who have not yet signed NFL contracts are not official members of the
NFLPA, the NFLPA rules do not regulate agents negotiating a player's
first contract with the league. Only agents representing current NFL
players are covered."' When negotiating a first-year player's contract,
therefore, an agent need not be certified nor adhere to the NFLPA regu-
lations. Since the rules do not apply to agents seeking players still in or
fresh out of college, the NFLPA provision prohibiting an agent from
luring clients by the proffering of gifts loses much of its meaning. It is at
this point-before an athlete signs his first professional contract-that he
may choose a long-term agent. Furthermore, gifts represent a much
more effective inducement when dangled in front of a financially disad-
vantaged college player than when offered to an established player pro-
tected by NFLPA regulations. Therefore, the rule restricting gift-giving
without covering the period before a player signs his first contact is
largely ineffective.
A second problem with the NFLPA plan is its expressly limited reg-
ulatory scope. In regulating only "contract advisors" of NFL players,
NFLPA rules prohibit the charging of excessive fees for only contract
negotiation and money-handling services." 2 Hence, agents who provide
promotional or endorsement-finding services can charge excessive fees
for those services and effectively evade the NFLPA fee restrictions. Fur-
ther, while NFLPA regulations may protect NFL players and restrict the
agents of these players, these rules are analogous to NCAA rules in that
they regulate only one comer of the sports world. Although the plan's
limited scope does allow the NFLPA to fit the regulations to the particu-
lar problems of the sport of football, the rules have no effect on agents
acting outside of the NFL. Thus, limiting the scope of the rules to a
particular sport prevents NFLPA rules from acting as a comprehensive
cure for the agent abuse epidemic.
Another potential problem posed by the NFLPA regulations is that
the rules do not consider "contractual incentive bonuses" to be part of a
player's "compensation." ' 1 3 Since under the rules the agent may collect
110. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
11. See NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 94, § I, at 2.
112. Iad § 1, at 2-3.
113. Id. § (4)(C), at 10. A "bonus" is defined as "[a] sum of money paid to an athlete for
signing a contract or meeting certain criteria, such as playing in a certain number of games or
making an all-star team." R. RuxIN, supra note 18, at 101.
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only up to a maximum specified percentage of the player's "compensa-
tion," a potential conflict of interest could arise for the agent. The ath-
lete in some cases may prefer to earn a slightly lower base salary coupled
with the possibility of obtaining lucrative incentive payments, rather than
making a slightly higher base salary. Out of self-interest, however, the
agent may negotiate the contract with a slightly higher base salary and
no incentive clause because his fee would be higher under such a con-
tract. Although the athlete's performance may earn the bonus, it is the
agent's contract negotiation skills that give the athlete the opportunity to
earn the bonus. Without a skillful agent advocating the insertion of in-
centive clauses in the contract, there likely would be no incentive pay-
ments to earn. Since the agent works to benefit the athlete by adding
incentive provisions to the contract, his fee percentages should be based
partially on that work.
Another drawback of the NFLPA regulations is the lack of specific,
objective criteria for granting or denying agent certification. The
NFLPA certification rules do not require that a prospective agent have
any contract negotiation experience or training. They also do not require
any express minimum standard of competence or ethical background. In
addition, because the only express grounds for denial of certification are
those for egregious misconduct, such as embezzlement or theft, the regu-
lations' standards are too low to ensure that all agents certified by the
NFLPA are agents of quality. As one agent noted: "The (NFLPA) reg-
ulations are a farce because everybody gets certified. No objective crite-
ria means everybody gets in and can stay in as long as they go to a
seminar once a year."1 14 Clearly, higher certification standards would
improve the quality of NFL players' agents.
A final and potentially fatal problem of the NFLPA plan is its lack
of enforceability. Although the National Labor Relations Act gives the
NFLPA the exclusive right to bargain collectively for NFL players, it
does not give the NFLPA the right to bargain individually for its mem-
bers. 11 5 If the NFLPA does not possess this individual bargaining
power, it cannot require its sports agents to become certified as "Con-
tract Advisors". This regulatory defect allows NFL player agents, if
they choose, to ignore the entire plan. The determination of whether the
NFLPA can bargain for its individual members likely will not be reached
until an agent challenges the NFLPA rules.
b. National Basketball Players' Association (NBPA)
The NBPA, the National Basketball Association's (NBA) players'
union, was formed to protect player's collective bargaining rights, as well
as other interests. As of March 1986, the NBPA adopted the "NBPA
114. Shapiro, supra note 35.
115. See Sobel, supra note 14, at 8.
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Regulations Governing Player Agents" in an effort to ensure representa-
tion by qualified agents. 116 The regulations require that any agent wish-
ing to negotiate contracts for N-BPA members must be certified by the
association before he may begin negotiations with the player.1 7 Similar
to the NFLPA plan, the NBPA certification procedure requires detailed
disclosure of an applicant's background. 118 Grounds for denial of certifi-
cation,11 9 rules for agent conduct,120 disciplinary measures,12' and dis-
pute resolution procedures 2 2 also loosely parallel the NFLPA
regulations. A few significant differences, however, distinguish the two
players' association schemes.
First, the NBPA plan expressly covers agents of players who have
yet to sign their first contract with an NBA team.1 23 In comparison with
the NFLPA, the NBPA regulatory arm reaches into the critical period
when the player chooses the agent and signs a possibly long-term con-
tract with an NBA team. By applying the rules to agents of rookies, the
NBPA can curb more effectively the gift-giving practices of unqualified
agents.
A second difference is that the NBPA rules include incentive pay-
ments as part of the "NBPA player's compensation" from which an
agent derives his fee percentage.' 2 4 Thus, if a contract with many incen-
tives better suits the NBPA player, the agent will negotiate for such
clauses because they are in both the agent's and the player's best inter-
ests. In contrast, because incentive payments are not considered com-
pensation by the NFLPA plan, the agent of the NFLPA player may
favor his interests that are not aligned with the player's and fail to negoti-
ate for these incentives in favor of a higher base salary.
A third difference concerns the type of agent functions regulated by
the respective plans. Since NFLPA regulations cover only "Contract
Advisors," agents of NFLPA athletes can sidestep maximum fee provi-
sions by charging excessive fees for services provided outside of the con-
tract negotiation and money-handling roles. At first glance, such
sidestepping appears even easier under the NBPA scheme because it gov-
erns only contract negotiation, not any financial or other services.' 2 5 The
116. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION, NBPA REGULATIONS Gov-
ERNING PLAYER AGENTS 1 (1986) [hereinafter NBPA REGULATIONS].
117. IdL § 3(A), at 4.
118. Id. § 3(A), at 13-22.
119. Id. §2(C), at 4.
120. Id. § 3, at 5-6.
121. Id. § 6, at 11. No fines, however, are levied by the NBPA. Id § 6(D), at 10.
122. Id. §§ 6, 7, at 9-12.
123. Id § 1, at 3.
124. "In computing the maximum allowable fee, the term 'compensation' shall include
base salary, signing bonus and any performance bonus actually received by the player." Id.
§ 4(B), at 7.
125. Id § I(B), at 3. The regulations govern "the providing of advice, counsel, informa-
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scope of the NBPA plan, however, allows the NBPA to prohibit fraudu-
lent actions and excessive fees if the agent's actions are deemed to "di-
rectly bear upon the player agent's integrity, competence or ability to
represent individual NBA players."
126
A final difference between the NFLPA and NBPA plans is that a
NBPA provision expressly forbids agents from collecting fees directly
from a player-client's team.1 27 This provision, and another prohibiting
player agents from simultaneously representing any league general man-
ager, 128 helps prevent obvious conflicts of interest that could arise for an
agent.
Postdating the NFLPA plan by almost three years, the NBPA regu-
lations clearly attempted to avoid its predecessor's weaknesses. The
NBPA plan, however, has not avoided all of the NFLPA regulations'
drawbacks. Since the NBPA rules govern only agents of NBPA mem-
bers, the rules' effect is limited to the sport of basketball and therefore
attack only a small portion of agent abuse. As with the NFLPA regula-
tions, the NBPA provides neither specific and meaningful objective stan-
dards to guide certification procedures, nor threshold standards for
competence or ethical background. Finally, even though the NBPA, un-
like the NFLPA, does not require the agent to be a NBPA member
before he may represent a player, the validity of the breadth of its regula-
tory reach under federal labor laws is questionable.
129
c. Major League Baseball Players' Association (MLBPA)
The MLBPA intends to adopt agent regulations of its own that will
take effect before the 1988 baseball season. Current MLBPA regulations
are limited to reviewing agents upon player request 30 and ensuring, by
agent authorization forms, that each MLBPA member has only one
tion or assistance to players with respect to negotiating their contract; the conduct of compen-
sation negotiations with clubs... and any other activity or conduct which directly bears upon
the player agent's integrity, competence or ability to properly represent individual NBA play-
ers." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 3(B)(h), at 6.
128. Id. § 3(B)(1), at 6.
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Although the NBPA is the exclusive
collective bargaining agent for NBA players, whether the NBPA has the power under the
National Labor Relations Act to negotiate individual athletes' contracts is unclear.
130. REPORT, supra note 22, at 73.
[W]e do advise the players that when they have any curiosity about someone they are
considering retaining that we will do our best to find out what we can about that
person's background, in terms of what is thought of his honesty and competence, and
report back to the player.
Hearings, supra note 16, at 383-84 (testimony of Marvin J. Miller, executive director,
MLBPA).
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agent. 131
d. Advantages and Disadvantages of Players' Associations
In summary, an advantage of regulation by players' associations is
that the association may tailor the rules to fit the regulatory needs of the
particular sport. And, since athletes themselves constitute the bodies
that control certification and sanction procedures, interested enforcement
results. Finally, those most interested in adequate regulation-the play-
ers-pay for the rules and their enforcement through association dues, so
taxpayers do not bear the direct economic burden for the regulations.
Even with these advantages, however, the regulations possess inherent
limitations in content, scope, and jurisdiction that hinder their effective-
ness. As the former president of the National Sports Lawyers' Associa-
tion noted: "The players' associations are trying to improve the situation
and have the right idea. But the rules fail to reach all the agents and
abuses and must by necessity be tentative in enforcement. We need a
stronger regulatory base."
132
B. State Legislative Attempts
State legislation has three significant advantages over non-legislative
regulation. First, legislation can require that all agents in all sports abide
by the rules. The regulatory impact is limited neither by the voluntary
status hampering the NCAA or ARPA regulations nor the confining
sport-specific scope of the NFLPA and NBPA plans. Second, legislative
authority adds teeth to the regulations by making criminal sanctions pos-
sible. While ARPA, the NCAA, and players' associations can threaten
revocation, suspension, or civil penalties, a legislature's imposition of
statutory criminal sanctions may act as a more effective deterrent to
agent abuse. In addition, the state's proven enforcement power poses a
far more tangible threat than do the untested enforcement mechanisms of
the non-legislative regulations.
(1) California
Acknowledging the necessity of legislative action, California passed
the first statutory regulation of sports agents in 1981,133 entitled the Ath-
lete Agencies Act (Act). The Act was amended in 1985 to eliminate in-
131. MLBPA Player Agent Authorization Form (1986).
132. Shefsky, supra note 49. "Players' associations cannot aggressively enforce their regu-
lations because they know their enforcement power is questionable under the NLRA and be-
cause they fear lawsuits by noncertified agents claiming they should have been certified." Id
133. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West Supp. 1987). Regarding the need for the regu-
lation, see California Hearings; supra note 54, at 7-8 (testimony of Jeffrey Walsh, attorney); id
at 9 (testimony of Gene Upshaw, executive director, National Football League Players'
Association).
July 1988]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
adequacies and to resolve uncertainties in the Act's coverage.1 34
Under the amended Act, agents of rookie or veteran athletes in all
professional sports must obtain a license from the California State Labor
Commissioner (Labor Commissioner) before either soliciting an athlete
for the purpose of representing him or negotiating "professional sports
services contracts" for the athlete.135  The Labor Commissioner may
base the approval or denial of a license on the applicant's education,
training, experience, and character. 136 Fees collected by the Labor Com-
missioner in the licensing process include an application fee, an annual
license renewal charge, and an annual charge for each "branch office"
maintained by the agent.
137
The Act further provides that all representation contracts must be
written on a form approved by the Labor Commissioner1 38 and must
contain a disclaimer clause which provides that although the agent is
registered with the Labor Commission, such registration does not imply
state assurance of the agent's competence. 139 Similar to the NFLPA and
NBPA regulations, the Act sets a maximum fee percentage; in addition,
however, the Act requires the filing of a licensed agent's fee schedule
with the Labor Commissioner and the inclusion of the fee schedule in
each representation contract. 14° Unlike the NFLPA and NBPA, Califor-
nia requires each licensed agent to post a surety bond of $25,000 to com-
pensate an athlete for damages resulting from agent misconduct. 141 The
Act prohibits the agent from involving himself in potential conflicts of
interest.142 Finally, violation of the Act's provisions may result in license
revocation or suspension 43 or even criminal liability.'
44
134. §§ 1500-1547. The amendment, entitled Senate Bill No. 11, was signed into law on
September 20, 1985, and became effective on January 1, 1986.
135. Id. § 1500(b)-(d), 1510.
136. Id. § 1512.
137. Id. § 1517(a)-(b). The Labor Commissioner may set fees in the amount "necessary to
generate sufficient revenue to cover the costs of administration and enforcement of this Chap-
ter." Id. § 1518.
138. Id. § 1530.5(a).
139. Id. § 1530.
140. Id. § 1531(b).
141. Id. § 1519(a).
142. The Act addresses three potential conflict of interest situations. First, the Act pro-
hibits agents from possessing financial interests in an "entity which is directly involved in the
same sport" as their athlete-clients. Id. § 1535.5(a). Second, agents are required to disclose
their ownership interests in investments upon which they are advising the client. Id. § 1535.7.
Third, no full time employee of a union or players' association may "own or participate in any
of the revenues of an athlete agent." Id. § 1539(c).
143. Id. § 1527.
144. Id. § 1547. The Labor Commissioner is charged with resolving agent-athlete dis-
putes, with the possibility of judicial review on appeal. Id. § 1543. For example, Reggie Rog-
ers, first-round draft pick of the Detroit Lions in 1987, has filed a lawsuit against agents Norby
Walters and G. Patrick Healy that seeks $2.7 million in damages for fraudulent conduct in
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Despite these regulatory incentives for the agent to heed the legisla-
tion and apply for a license, the Act is ignored by most agents. Six years
after the Act's mandate that all agents apply for licenses, only fourteen
agents have registered with the State of California.
145
A plethora of reasons account for the agents' neglect of the Act.
First, the Act applies only to agents who are subject to California law.
This jurisdictional limitation excludes from the Act's regulatory grasp
the many agents living outside of California who may do business but
have insufficient "contacts" with the state.146 Although agents domiciled
in California certainly appear to be within its jurisdictional reach, 1 47 the
Act does not expressly cover agents who merely conduct contract negoti-
ations in California or whose clients live in California or are employed by
violation of the Act. Rogers' San Francisco-based attorney, Edward Vincent King, Jr., notes
that "[n]either Mr. Walters nor Mr. Healy registered with the State of California as agents, but
they both still signed Reggie to contracts. That's a violation of state law." Attorney Says Rog-
ers'Agent Violated the Law, San Francisco Examiner, May 9, 1987, at C2, col. 4.
145. Telephone interview with Carole Cole, area administrator, Division of Labor Stan-
dards Enforcement, State of California (Sept. 29, 1986) [hereinafter Cole]. Furthermore, the
Labor Commissioner has neither brought a disciplinary action against one of the few registered
agents nor brought an enforcement action against an unregistered agent. Id
146. The United States Supreme Court has set the standard for determining whether a
state may constitutionally subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of its courts:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Accordingly, a state's laws may govern the conduct only of those
reachable by the state's courts under the International Shoe analysis; that is, a state law such as
the Act is enforceable against only those agents who have minimum contacts with the state.
See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463-64 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de C-
lombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
n.4 (1984). Contacts that the Supreme Court has deemed sufficient for coverage by a state's
courts and laws include contracts with state residents in which the out-of-state party deliber-
ately has reached into the state, as evidenced by the contract terms and the course of dealing
between the parties, see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-80; the defendant's "purposeful avail-
ment" of the state's economic benefits and laws, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); and continuous and systematic business contacts, Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-18. In
the case of nonresident agents, the agent would fear coverage by the Act only if he has suffi-
cient ties to the state-whether under the Burger King, Hanson, or Helicopteros analysis.
Whether he does would certainly be open to question in many cases; in addition, many agents
may violate the provisions of the Act because they don't consider themselves subject to the
state's jurisdiction.
A detailed discussion of personal jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Note. For a good
analysis of the personal jurisdiction cases, see 22 WEST's FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST § 11, at
87 (3d ed. 1984).
147. "Domicile in the state is alone sufficient" to bring a defendant within the jurisdic-
tional reach of the courts and laws of the state. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940);
L.D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Indus., 265 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1956).
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California teams. 148 California does extend its jurisdiction, however, to
the limits allowed under the federal constitution.149 Despite this lack of
express coverage and a possible lack of sufficient "contacts," the Labor
Commissioner considers the Act to cover not only agents with a resi-
dence or office in California, but also out-of-state agents with client-ath-
letes living or working in the state. 50 The scope of California's
jurisdiction will probably remain unanswered until an out-of-state agent
challenges the Act's reach.1 51 Until then, out-of-state agents will proba-
bly use vagueness of jurisdiction to excuse their ignorance of the Act.
A second reason for the paucity of response to the legislation is that
the Act covers only those agents who engage in contract negotiations.
The Act does not appear to apply to agents who perform only money-
handling, investment, or promotional services. 152 As evidenced by the
148. California's four major league professional football teams-the Los Angeles Raiders,
the Los Angeles Rams, the San Francisco Forty-Niners, and the San Diego Chargers-each
employ at least fifty players (including players on injured reserve lists) at any one time. The
State's five professional baseball teams-the San Francisco Giants, the Oakland Athletics, the
San Diego Padres, the California Angels, and the Los Angeles Dodgers-each employ at least
twenty-five major league players (including those on injured reserve and other comparable
lists) per year. The State's four major league professional basketball teams-the Los Angeles
Lakers, the Golden State Warriors, the Sacramento Kings, and the Los Angeles Clippers-
always have over ten player-employees on their rosters. Thus, California-based professional
football, baseball, and basketball teams employ well over 300 players. Employed professional
athletes on minor league teams in these sports and on teams in other sports (such as hockey,
soccer, volleyball, and team tennis) account for still more California-based team athletes.
149. In personam jurisdiction of California courts under California's long-arm statute is
coextensive with the outer limits of due process under the California and federal constitutions.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1983); Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516
F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1975). See infra note 265 and accompanying text for an illustration of
the jurisdictional chaos the Act and comparable statutes in other states could cause.
150. Cole, supra note 145; see also Sobel, supra note 14, at 7 (discussion of and support for
the Labor Commissioner's intent to cover out-of-state agents with the Act's provisions).
151. Telephone interview with Carole Cole, area administrator, Division of Labor Stan-
dards Enforcement, State of California (May 24, 1988).
152. Another set of California statutes does regulate, by certification and punishment for
violations, the activities of investment advisers. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25230-25237 (West 1983).
These regulations, however, govern the activities of only those who meet the statutory defini-
tion of "investment adviser." That is, the regulations cover only those who engage in the
business of analyzing securities or advising others as to the value of securities. Id. § 25009. To
qualify as a security, a subject of investment must be an item-such as a note, a stock, or an
investment contract-listed in the statutory definition of "security." Id. § 25019.
The query of whether the often informal but potentially disastrous "financial assistance"
offered by some agents is governed by the statutory regulations of "investment advisers" is
probably resolvable only on a case-by-case basis. To determine that a sports agent violated the
"investment advisers" regulations, a court would have to determine that a "security" was
involved and that the sports agent was engaged in the securities-analyzing or securities-advis-
ing business. It seems uncertain whether the informal advice/money-handling of some agents
would meet the definitional prerequisites of the laws regulating "investment advisers." No
cases have been brought against abusive agents under these laws.
Even if the Corporations Code sections did by some definitional stretch of the imagination
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agent abuses of Courrege and Sorkin discussed earlier,153 a great poten-
tial for abuse exists when a sports agent handles an athlete's money or
advises him regarding investments. The Act's failure to cover these areas
of potential agent abuse provides "investment" and "promotion" agents
with another barricade which the regulation does not penetrate.
The final cause for the widespread neglect of the Act is its attorney
exemption. Attorney-agents who are members of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia are not considered "athlete agents" and are not covered by the Act
when "acting as legal counsel."' 154 Consequently, although a 1985
amendment of the California Business and Professions Code made some
provisions expressly applicable to California attorneys, 155 attorneys "act-
ing as legal counsel" are nevertheless exempt from the basic licensing
requirement and most other provisions of the Act. Because the Act does
not define when an attorney is acting as "legal counsel," many California
attorneys contend that contract negotiation is a legal function 156 and that
the State Bar Act sufficiently governs their conduct. 157 These attorneys,
interpreting the exemption's ambiguity to their advantage, consider
cover all agents providing financial assistance to their clients, the Author asserts that any
duplicative coverage of sports agents-by the Act and by the laws regulating investment advis-
ers-is not bad. If the Act is to serve any purpose as a resource whereby athletes can obtain a
list of all registered, and thus state-certified as qualified, agents, the Act should mandate that
all agents, even those "only" handling the money of their athlete-clients, must register under
the Act. Only by such registration of money-handlers could athletes discover which money-
handling agents were registered and thereby, ostensibly, qualified. Moreover, the only negative
aspect of the potential duplicative coverage-a slightly-increased burden on investment adviser
agents (who would have to register under two laws)-is outweighed by the increased protec-
tion for athletes that double statutory coverage would provide. By imposing the regulations of
both the Act and the investment adviser statutes upon money-handling agents, the state of
California would put up a double-shield of statutory protection against abuse by the agents.
Such double protection would be a vast improvement over the current system, where the act
does not mention or cover agents who are only financial advisers and the investment adviser
statutes which may not definitionally cover all sports agents handling the money of their cli-
ent-athletes.
153. See supra notes 1, 36-45 and accompanying text.
154. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1500(b) (West Supp. 1987).
155. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106.7 (West Supp. 1987). This statute makes five spe-
cific provisions of the Act part of the State Bar Act, thus applicable to lawyers. Attorney
violations of any of these five provisions are "cause for the imposition of discipline" by the
State Bar, not by the Labor Commissioner. Id
156. See, eg., California Hearings, supra note 54, at 13, 15 (testimony of Ted Steinberg,
Esq., agent). The Labor Commissioner, on the other hand, feels that contract negotiation
alone does not constitute the practice of law and that, therefore, the entire Act should cover
the attorney-agents who only negotiate contracts for their clients. Cole, supra note 145. Nev-
ertheless, this view has not been expressly adopted by the California legislature.
157. See, eg., Letter from Leigh Steinberg, agent, to California Senator Bill Greene, chair-
man of the California Legislature's Select Committee on Licensed and Designated Sports (Apr.
24, 1985). "Inasmuch as the State Bar regulates the actions of attorneys, I feel any duplication
of effort unfairly prejudices and unresonably burdens practicing lawyers in this State." Id
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themselves free from the licensing requirement and the regulatory reach
of most of the Act.
Notwithstanding the attorney exemption's crippling ambiguity,
there is no solid rationale for the exemption. This indicates that attor-
neys, whether "acting as legal counsel" or not, should not receive prefer-
ential treatment under the Act. Any conflicts between the Act and the
State Bar Act that made compliance with one law a violation of the other
were eliminated by the Act's 1985 amendment, thereby eradicating any
rationale for an attorney exemption. 158 Furthermore, the argument that
the Act is redundant when applied to attorneys is flawed. Although pro-
visions prohibiting gift-giving,1 59  fee-splitting,1 60  commingling of
funds, 16 1 and conflicts of interest 162 are present in both the Act and the
State Bar Act, the duplication has no negative effect. Moreover, these
"redundancies" have the positive effect of adding teeth to lackadaisically
enforced State Bar Act rules. 163 Removing the attorney exemption
would merely force attorney-agents to follow essentially the same rules in
the Act by which they are bound as members of the California State Bar
Association. 
64
Another rationale for allowing the attorney exemption is that im-
posing a bond-posting requirement on attorneys is unfair. 165 Since not
all lawyers carry professional liability insurance, however, the bond-post-
ing requirement would be neither overburdensome nor superfluous when
158. The Act's 1985 amendment, by repealing a provision that required agents to file cop-
ies of their registration certificates with that school prior to contacting any student athlete of a
school, negated any conflict with State Bar Act rules against solicitation. Compare 1981 Cal.
Stat. ch. 929, § 1545(b), at 3494 (repealed 1985) with CAL. LAB. CODE § 1545 (West Supp.
1987); see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6151-6154 (West 1974 & Supp. 1987); RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 2-101(B) (West 1983)
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA RPC]. The 1985 amendment also averted a potential conflict with
the State Bar Act rules, which forbid the breach of attorney-client confidences, by repealing a
provision requiring the filing of representation contracts with the student-athlete's school. See
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 929, § 1, at 3487, repealed by 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 1133, § 36.5, codified at
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1545 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West Supp.
1987).
159. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1539(b) (West Supp. 1987); CALIFORNIA RPC, supra note 158,
Rules 2-108(B), 3-102(B).
160. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1539(a) (West Supp. 1987); CALIFORNIA RPC supra note 158,
Rules 2-108(A), 3-102(A).
161. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1531.5 (West Supp. 1987); CALIFORNIA RPC, supra note 158,
Rule 8-101.
162. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1535.5, 1535.7 (West Supp. 1987); CALIFORNIA RPC, supra note
158, Rules 4-101, 5-101, 5-102.
163. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1511(d), 1512 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6060-6068 (West 1974 & Supp. 1987); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 94, 363 (West 1978).
164. See State Bar's Discipline System Hit, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 29, 1985, part 1, at 1,
col. 1. Duplication would only mean that some currently unenforced State Bar Act rules
would be enforced at least against attorneys who are agents. Id.
165. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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applied to attorney-agents without such insurance. An attorney cannot
argue that because he may represent only a few athletes, he should not
have to post the bond. All sports agents must decide whether their occu-
pation as a sports agent is economically viable. Lawyers should not be
exempt from a fee that does not discriminate against them.
Thus, the Act's attorney exemption suffers from ambiguity of cover-
age and a lack of valid underlying policy support. This exemption, the
inherently limited jurisdiction of a state law, and the Act's application
only to contract negotiators, all contribute to the pervasive lack of com-
pliance by agents to the Act's requirements. Even if it were followed,
substantive problems still would hinder the Act's effectiveness. For in-
stance, the posting of a $25,000 bond inadequately protects the athlete
from agent misconduct. In light of the high salaries 166 that athletes cur-
rently receive and that agents therefore can potentially squander, many
athletes will find little solace in the Act's economic remedy.
Additionally, as with the non-legislative forms of regulation previ-
ously discussed, the Act does not require agents to meet any objective
criteria before receiving a license. No minimum standard, therefore,
guides the Labor Commissioner in his review of a license application.167
Although three sections of the Act give the Labor Commissioner the
power to create objective criteria for the revocation or suspension of
licenses,1 68 the Commissioner has not set such standards. 169 Precise
standards in the licensing and revocation-suspension areas would ensure
the licensing of qualified agents, provide a clarified guide of conduct for a
licensed agent to follow, and allow for more definite and more just en-
forcement of the Act.
Although hampered by their voluntary nature and the lack of statu-
tory enforcement mechanisms, players' association regulations are supe-
rior to the Act in some important respects. First, although the
associations have attempted to curb the luring of potential clients with
material items, the Act does not restrict agent-to-athlete gifts. 170 Second,
players' association regulations are funded by the member-athletes' union
dues without resort to public taxes. Finally, these regulations are im-
posed by organizations with financial and ideological interests in their
enforcement. Despite possessing the advantages inherent to legislation,
166. For examples of the hefty sums paid to NFL players, see Gridiron Green: What NFL
Players Earn, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1988, at 9C.
167. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1512 (West Supp. 1987). In the years the Act has been in effect,
the Labor Commissioner has refused to grant only one applicant's registration. Cole, supra
note 145.
168. §§ 1511(d), 1527, 1534.
169. Cole, supra note 145.
170. The Act does prohibit the agent from offering anything of value, including legal serv-
ices, to a university employee (athletic director or coach, for example) in exchange for the
referral of any client by the employee. § 1539(b).
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therefore, the Act is laden with inadequacies of jurisdiction, scope, clar-
ity, and substantive effect. Consequently, this first state legislative at-
tempt to regulate sports agents is essentially ignored, falling far short of
effectively quelling agent abuse.
(2) Oklahoma
Oklahoma has also recognized and acted legislatively on the need
for agent regulation. The Oklahoma Athlete Agent Act (Act), which
became effective in July of 1985, requires that an athlete agent be regis-
tered with the Oklahoma Secretary of State (the Secretary) before con-
tacting student athletes who are in Oklahoma and who either have
eligibility remaining at NCAA schools in Oklahoma or who are resident,
non-NCAA athletes who have never signed a contract with a profes-
sional sports team. 171 The Secretary considers the applicant's training,
experience, and education in approving or denying registration. 172 Reg-
istered agents must pay a $1,000 annual filing fee' 73 and must post a
$100,000 bond or possess $100,000 worth of liability insurance. 174 The
Act imposes additional requirements on registered agents who deal with
Oklahoma non-NCAA athletes. Representation contracts with such ath-
letes must denote explicitly that the agent is registered, but that such
registration does not imply the Secretary's endorsement of the agent. 175
In addition, the Act provides a maximum limit on the amount of fees an
agent can charge to an Oklahoma non-NCAA athlete. This rule, how-
ever, applies only to multi-year contracts with professional sports teams
for Oklahoma, non-NCAA athletes signing theirfirst contract. 17 6 If the
contract fits into this narrow class covered by the restriction, the agent
may not charge an annual fee greater than the amount the athlete has
contracted to receive during that twelve-month period. 177 Registered
agents are required to file fee schedules with the Secretary, but only for
Oklahoma, non-NCAA athletes. 78 Agents must file all student athlete
representation agreements with the Secretary and, if the athlete is a stu-
dent at a non-NCAA "institution of higher education" located in
Oklahoma, with the athletic director at the student's school. 179 Offering
171. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62(A)(l)-(2) (West 1986).
172. Id. § 821.62(C)(3). Although the Oklahoma law does authorize the Secretary to
adopt specific criteria for approving or denying these applications, the Secretary has not done
so. The Secretary has provided only that if the Secretary finds an agent's application to be
"unacceptable," the agent must be notified in writing of the reason for the application's rejec-
tion. Sobel, The Regulation of Player Agents (Revisited), 8 ENT. L. REP. 3, 5-6 (1986).
173. § 821.62(E).
174. Id. § 821.62(G).
175. Id. § 821.63(B).
176. Id. § 821.63(D).
177. Id.
178. Id. § 821.63(C).
179. Id. § 821.63(E).
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anything of value to a rookie non-NCAA athlete to induce him to agree
to a representation contract is unlawful 80 and, similar to other violations
of the Act, can result in revocation or suspension of the agent's registra-
tion or fines and/or imprisonment.1 81
The Oklahoma regulation possesses the same advantages inherent to
all legislative schemes that attempt to regulate sports agents. The Act
covers all agents and all sports, and the state has the statutory authority
to impose criminal sanctions and enforce regulatory measures. These
factors tend to favor legislative over non-legislative actions. The
Oklahoma statute also eli"fiinates some of the defects of its California
counterpart. The absence of an exemption for attorneys eliminates the
problems of limited scope and enforcement faced by the California regu-
lation.18 2 Additionally, the $100,000 bond requirement provides a more
realistic source for an abused athlete's remedy than does California's
$25,000 requirement.
18 3
The Oklahoma regulation, however, possesses most of the other
drawbacks of the California law and, because of its "bizarre" scope,
1 84
encounters several additional problems. Unlike the California Act,
whose flaws stem from its failure to provide a standard for the degree of
minimum contact with California necessary for jurisdiction, 8
5
Oklahoma's measure is much more definite, but also far more restrictive
in jurisdictional reach. Only agents who plan to contact certain amateur
athletes "while the athlete is located in [Oklahoma]" must register.
186
Thus, agents may escape the law merely by "staying out of the State of
Oklahoma altogether"' 187 when dealing with the few athletes purportedly
protected by the regulation.
The scope of the Oklahoma law is also exceedingly narrow because,
like California's regulation, it regulates only agents who negotiate con-
tracts.188 The Act thus allows those who provide only promotional or
money management services to contact and swindle athletes without fear
of punishment. The Oklahoma law is also limited to agents who negoti-
ate athletes' first contracts with professional teams. 189 If clients have
180. Id § 821.64 (7).
181. Id § 821.66.
182. See supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
184. Telephone interview with Lionel Sobel, Professor of Law, Loyola of Los Angeles Law
School (Sept. 22, 1986). "Some of the Oklahoma regulation's provisions are so absurd and
seemingly inconsistent that you wonder if you're looking at typographical errors when you
read the law." Id
185. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
186. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62(A)(l)-(2) (West 1986).
187. Nebraska Hearings, supra note 52, at 22 (testimony of Larry Albers, attorney-agent).
188. § 821.61(A)(2).
189. See id §§ 821.61(A)(2)-(5), 821.62(A)(1)-(2).
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previously signed contracts or participate in individual sports such as
golf or tennis, the agent is not covered by the Oklahoma law.
Perhaps the strangest and most substantively meaningless provision
of the Act is the "limitation" on the amount of fees an agent can charge.
To qualify for coverage the contract must be a multi-year agreement be-
tween an Oklahoma, non-NCAA athlete and a professional sports
team. 190 By excluding single-year and individual sport contracts and
those involving NCAA athletes from its fee restriction, the measure has
extremely limited impact.
Even more incredible is the provision's "limitation" on the amount
of fees the agent can receive. The agent may not charge an annual fee
greater than the amount the athlete has contracted to receive during that
twelve-month period. 19 1 An agent thus can collect up to 100 percent of
an athlete's compensation-hardly a limitation at all. Even if the provi-
sion were to apply to all contracts, these substantive deficiencies nullify
any potential for curbing abusive, excessive fees.
Other aspects of the Act detract from its effectiveness. The require-
ment that agents file copies of their representation contracts with the Sec-
retary and the athletic director at each Oklahoma, non-NCAA college
attended by a client' 92 forces an attorney-agent to violate the Oklahoma
State Bar's rules against divulging attorney-client confidences. 9 3  The
$100,000 bond requirement, while providing a viable source of relief for a
harmed athlete, imposes such a financial burden that competent agents
may be discouraged from registering. 
9 4
In addition, the law protects Oklahoma's non-NCAA athletes with
provisions prohibiting "buying" representation with gifts' 95 and requir-
ing submission of fee schedules, 9 6 but does not similarly protect NCAA
student athletes. The statute provides no rationale for this seemingly dis-
criminatory protection. Finally, like the regulations adopted by ARPA,
the NCAA, the players' associations, and California, the Oklahoma law
sets forth no objective threshold standards as prerequisites for agent
190. Id. § 821.63(D).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 821.63(E).
193. Id. tit. 5, § 3 (West 1986).
194. Securing a $100,000 bond would cost anywhere between three and five thousand dol-
lars. Telephone conversations on Apr. 11, 1988, with representatives of several bond compa-
nies: Adler Insurance Services, San Diego, California; Amwest Surety Insurance Company,
San Diego, California; Barrett Bonding and Insurance Company, San Diego and San Fran-
cisco, California. "I think it'd be fairly prohibitive.... [I]f we get it too high it's going to make
it impossible (to attract good agents to register)." Nebraska Hearings, supra note 52, at 20
(testimony of Charles Wright, attorney). "I'm not against... a larger fee, but I, I'm just trying
to get this so we can get this started." Id. at 9 (testimony of Robert Devaney, athletic director,
University of Nebraska).
195. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.64(7) (West 1986).
196. Id. § 821.63(C).
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registration. Hence, no precise guidelines are available for registering
and disciplining agents. Oklahoma's attempt to regulate agents therefore
suffers from many of the maladies plaguing other regulatory attempts
and features many additional, and sometimes absurd, drawbacks.
(3) Texas
Texas has recently enacted a statute regulating sports agents. 197 Ef-
fective October 2, 1987, the Texas Regulation of Athlete Agents governs
the conduct of an "athlete agent," defined as a person who, for compen-
sation, solicits an "athlete" to enter either a professional sports services
contract or a representation contract, whereby the athlete agent may ne-
gotiate with professional teams or may manage the athlete's finances.
198
Significantly, the statute covers only athletes who reside in Texas and
either remain eligible to participate in intercollegiate sports for a Texas
college team or have participated on such a team and have not yet signed
with a professional team. 199
The Texas statute requires that athlete agents register with the Sec-
retary of State of Texas (Secretary) before contacting athletes located in
Texas. 2°° The Secretary considers the applicant's relevant formal train-
ing, practical experience, and educational background in determining
whether or not to register the athlete agent, and may request five profes-
sional references. 201 Unless the applicant is a lawyer, the application
must contain the names of all persons with a financial interest in the
athlete agent's business; a lawyer need only name those persons involved
in his activities related to athlete agent representation. 20 2 All applicants
must pay a fee for initial registration20 3 and yearly registration re-
newal. 2°4 Those athlete agents entering into financial services contracts
with athletes must post a $100,000 surety bond with the Secretary.
20 5
The bond's issuance and maintenance are conditioned on the timely pay-
ment of all amounts due to the athlete under the financial services con-
tract and on the payment of all damages resulting from the mishandling
of the athlete's finances.20
6
Once registered and, if necessary, bonded, all representation con-
tracts must (1) be on a form approved by the Secretary; (2) contain ex-
plicit and prominent statements that the athlete agent is registered but
197. TEX. RFv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
198. Id. § I(a)(2).
199. d. § 1(a)(5).
200. Id. § 2(a).
201. Id. § 2(b)(3)-(4).
202. Id. § 2(b)(5); see infra note 223 for an explanation of this distinction.
203. § 2(d), (f).
204. Id. § 2(e).
205. Id § 2(h).
206. Id
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not endorsed by the state of Texas, that the athlete should not sign the
contract if he has not read it or if there are blank spaces in the contract,
and that the athlete may cancel the contract within sixteen days after
signing the contract; (3) be filed with the Secretary and with the athletic
directors of Texas colleges at which represented athletes are students;
and (4) state the amount of the fees to be paid by the athlete to the ath-
lete agent and describe the services for which the athlete is paying.
207
The athlete agent may collect no more than the fees stated in the con-
tract 20 8 and no more than the amount the athlete will receive in any
twelve-month period.
20 9
Moreover, the athlete agent may not divide fees with professional
teams or pay colleges for referring athletes to the agent.210 Nor may the
athlete agent contact an athlete student at a Texas college to discuss rep-
resentation or sign the athlete to a representation contract before the ath-
lete's last college game (including post-season play). 211 There are two
exceptions to this "no-contact" rule. First, the college may sponsor in-
terviews between athletes and registered athlete agents before the ath-
lete's final year212 of eligibility. Second, the athlete agent can send
written information regarding his credentials and services to the ath-
lete.213 The last general restriction of the statute provides that the athlete
agent may not offer anything of value to induce the athlete to sign a
representation contract.
21 4
If the athlete agent violates any of these prohibitions or any other
provision of the statute, the agent is subject to a civil penalty of up to
$10,000, forfeiture of the right to be repaid for any loans made to the
athlete to induce acceptance of representation, liability for restitution of
any consideration paid to the athlete agent by the athlete, payment of
attorneys' fees and court costs incurred by the athlete in suing the athlete
agent for conduct violating the statute, voiding of all representation con-
tracts covered by the statute, and a prison sentence of up to one year.
215
Like the California and Oklahoma regulatory schemes, the new
Texas statute is backed by the enforcement authority of the state and
therefore has more teeth than do the ARPA, NCAA, and players' associ-
ation regulations. Furthermore, all the state statutes share the advantage
of governing athlete agents regarding all sports, thereby avoiding the
sport-specific limitation inherent in the players' association regulations.
207. Id. § 5.
208. Id. § 5(c).
209. Id. § 5(d).
210. Id. § 6(b)(2)-(3).
211. Id. § 6(b)(5).
212. Id. § 7.
213. Id. § 6(c).
214. Id. § 6(b)(4).
215. Id. § 8.
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The Texas statute has managed to evade some of the drawbacks of
the California and Oklahoma regulations. First, unlike its state predeces-
sors in legislation, the Texas statute covers not only contract negotiators
but financial service providers as well. 216 Hence, an agent who only
manages his client's money cannot escape regulation as he can in
Oklahoma and California;217 consequently, the Texas statute has a
greater chance of stemming the tide of abuse that results from the misap-
propriation and mismanagement of funds by money handling agents such
as Sorkin,218 Young,219 Courrege,220 Rodri, 221 and Sports Plus, Inc.
222
Second, with one very minor exception,223 the Texas statute does not
exempt lawyers from coverage, thereby avoiding the gaping hole that
plagues California's law.224 Third, the $100,000 bond requirement, 225
like Oklahoma's requirement,226 is a source of recovery that offers more
solace to the victimized athlete than California's $25,000 bond require-
ment.227 Fourth, the Texas law is much more emphatic and precise than
its two statutory counterparts in prohibiting agents from enticing athletes
to sign representation agreements through material inducements.
22
Fifth, the statute's endorsement of college-sponsored agent-athlete inter-
views,229 while it may be a bit idealistic to hope for immediate acceptance
by either colleges or agents, is a step in the right direction. Finally, more
remedies are expressly available under this law230 than under its
216. Id. § l(a)(2).
217. See supra notes 154-57, 188 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 48.
222. Id
223. On his or her application for registration or renewal under the Texas statute, mem-
bers of the State Bar of Texas need not list all persons who are financially interested in the
attorney-agent's law firm or professional corporation. A member need list only those persons
who are involved in the attorney's activities pertaining to agent representation. Thus, for ex-
ample, the attorney-agent need not list non-agent partners in the attorney-agent's law firm. A
non-attorney applicant must list all persons financially interested in his business whether or
not actually involved in the business. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(b)(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
224. See supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
225. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(h) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
226. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
228. An athlete agent may not offer anything of value, excluding reasonable entertainment
and transportation expenses to and from the athlete agent's registered principal place of busi-
ness, to induce an athlete to enter into a representation agreement. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 8871, § 6(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The only defect of the provision is the vague-
ness of the term "reasonable" modifying "entertainment expenses" and possibly modifying
"transportation expenses."
229. Ia § 7.
230. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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Oklahoma and California predecessors.
Although the Texas statute has bypassed some of the negative as-
pects of the California and Oklahoma regulations, it has not avoided all
of them. The most glaring common disadvantage is the inherent limita-
tions to personal jurisdiction that accompany any state law.231 The
Texas legislature, probably conscious of its jurisdictional limitations, pro-
vided that the statute covers only those athlete agents contacting athletes
from Texas colleges232 who are located in Texas233 at the time of contact.
According to the statute, an agent contacting either an athlete born and
raised in Texas but studying and playing at an out-of-state school or an
athlete going to a Texas college but playing out-of-state (at a bowl game,
for example) at the time of contact need not register under the statute.
Thus, the geographical limitation on the statute's enforceability seriously
lessens any impact the statute may have on curbing agent abuse.
The Texas statute shares another deficiency with the California and
Oklahoma laws-agents need not meet any objective criteria to become
registered athlete agents. Without such criteria, registration becomes a
mere formality, rather than a process that ensures only qualified agents
are allowed to handle athletes' business and financial affairs. Another
disadvantage common to all three states' laws is that by filing representa-
tion contracts with secretaries of state and with athletic directors, an at-
torney-agent's confidential relationship with his athlete-client may be
impaired. Finally, as in Oklahoma, an agent regulated under the Texas
statute may receive as much in fees as the athlete does in salary in any
given year,234 as long as the fee collection correlates to the fee schedule in
the representation contract.235 The Texas fee "limitations" hardly will
serve to protect athletes from overcharging by greedy agents.
The most severe deficiency of the Texas statute, as with the
Oklahoma law, is that it regulates agent contact and dealings only with
college-age athletes. 236 Indeed, the statute's goals, stated in the wake of
the conduct of Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom, 237 are "to attempt to
stop the recent rash of players losing eligibility because of violations of
NCAA regulations and to defray the negative publicity for Texas univer-
sities. '' 238 Even if the Texas statute achieves these goals, the statute will
be melting but a tip of the agent-abuse iceberg. The statute still leaves
professional athletes without regulatory protection. By protecting one or
231. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
232. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § l(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
233. Id. § 2(a).
234. Id. § 5(d).
235. Id. § 5(c).
236. Id. § l(a)(5).
237. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
238. Letter from Ken Armbrister, Texas State Senator, to Leigh Steinberg, agent (Dec. 1,
1987) (discussing Texas statute).
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two years of an athlete's life, the law does nothing to stop the types of
woes that have befallen Bill Bates, 239 Eric Dickerson,24° Jerry Rice,
241
and many others.
The final problem with the statute is one unique to the Texas
scheme. By imposing the bond requirement only upon agents perform-
ing financial services, 242 the statute provides no remedial source of funds
for athletes harmed by overcharging or other misconduct of an agent
who only negotiates contracts. Although the greatest financial harm to
athletes, especially those few protected by the Texas statute, may come
from mishandling of finances, a bond requirement should be imposed on
all agents to protect athletes from all types of agent misconduct.
Because the Texas statute evades many of the drawbacks of the Cali-
fornia and Oklahoma laws-by regulating financial service agents, by
emphatically forbidding the "buying" of college athletes, by endorsing
college sponsorship of athlete agent conferences, and by providing a mul-
titude of remedies for violations-the Texas statute may in many ways
become a more effective tool at attacking agent abuse than its ground-
breaking legislative predecessors. Yet even the Texas statute, primarily
by virtue of its jurisdictional limitations and scope of application, is
sorely inadequate as a deterrent to unscrupulous agents. 243 As with any
regulation of the still essentially unregulated sports agent profession, the
Texas statute takes a step in the right direction. But it is a very small
step, and easy for abusive agents to outrun.
(4) Other Regulatory Attempts
Following the lead of California, Oklahoma, and Texas, other states
are contemplating legislation to regulate sports agents. The Nebraska
Legislature's Judiciary Committee has extensively discussed two different
agent regulation bills,244 and Illinois, Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan,
and Ohio are also considering regulatory measures. 245 Lawmakers in
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona, and Tennessee have said they will soon
propose statutes governing agents. 246 Some commentators have stated
239. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 48.
241. Id.
242. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(h) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
243. "[T]he hodgepodge of state rules provides no better a defense than a weak group of
linemen on the gridiron: They leave gaping holes to charge through. 'Bad agents will just
shop elsewhere,' avoiding states with tough restrictions, says John Weistart, a Duke University
law professor, who teaches a course called 'Athletics and the Legal Process.' "Wartzman, Fair
Play. States Crack Down on Agents Who Sign Up Ineligible Athletes, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1987,
at 37, col. 4.
244. L.B. 755, 89th Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1986); L.B. 1226, 89th Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (1986);
see Nebraska Hearings, supra note 52, at 18 (testimony of Charles Wright, attorney).
245. Wartzman, supra note 243, at 37, col. 4.
246, Id.
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that this state-by-state regulation of sports agents will continue until
Congress passes preemptive federal legislation. 247
III. The Need for Federal Regulation
By 1975, the rise in athlete salaries had already led to a consequent
rise in sports agent abuse. In response to these problems, the United
States House of Representatives' Select Committee on Professional
Sports (Committee), appointed in 1975 to investigate many of the sports
world's woes, conducted hearings to consider the viability of federal reg-
ulation of agents. 248 Witnesses at the hearings described sports agents as,
among other things, destructive, 249 self-serving,250 and void of "integrity,
team loyalty, or any of the other traditional values you expect to see in
sports. 12 5 1 At the outset of the hearings, the Committee's objective was
a "unanimous legislative recommendation for the legislature to solve the
problems of professional sports.
'252
Although the Committee acknowledged the need for sports agents,
the rampant abuses occurring in the profession, and the inadequacies of
existing regulation,253 the Committee concluded that "the precise nature
and scope of the problem still needs to be identified. ' 254 The Committee
further noted that "[t]he examples of malpractice ... are certainly dra-
matic but an insufficient sample upon which to base any recommendation
for legislation. 25 5 Thus, although "disturbed at the apparent casual, di-
vergent and unquestioned ethical standards" of sports agents,256 the
Committee did not realize its objective of formulating regulatory legisla-
tion. It instead recommended that a "successor committee undertake an
investigation to determine the nature and scope of abuses of the agent-
client relationship in professional sports, the appropriateness of Federal
involvement in this area, and the need for protective legislation. '257
247. Shapiro, supra note 35; Shefsky, supra note 49; Brinkman, supra note 69: Nebraska
Hearings, supra note 52, at 7 (testimony of Robert Devaney, athletic director, University of
Nebraska).
248. Hearings, supra note 16.
249. Id. at 165 (testimony of Harrison Vickers, owner, Houston Aeros).
250. Id. at 201 (testimony of Walter Bush, owner, Minnesota North Stars). "They take
the money off the top. Say you sign a player for $250,000, they take $25,000 for a few hours'
work." Id.
251. Id. at 165 (testimony of Harrison Vickers, owner, Houston Aeros).
252. Id. at 4 (introductory remarks by Representative Silvio 0. Conte, committee
member).
253. REPORT, supra note 22, at 71-73. "There are no agents associations or other such
bodies that set ethical standards and police the profession." Id at 72.
254. Id. at 77.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 79. The Select Committee recognized that in this investigation "federal licens-
ing may be considered." Id.
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No such successor has been established. As a result, although mis-
conduct by sports agents has increased, 258 the federal legislation hoped
for by the Committee ten years ago has not yet materialized. In light of
the increasing abuse, the need for federal regulation of sports agents is
now greater than ever.
The inadequacies of confusing, burdensome, and inconsistent state-
by-state regulation call resoundingly for preemptive2 59 federal legislation.
As noted in the discussions of the California, 260 Oklahoma,261 and
Texas262 laws, the jurisdiction of state regulation of sports agents is un-
certain and limited. Even when the regulations reach as far as due pro-
cess will allow, state regulations are limited because they will not reach
those agents who have insufficient contacts with the state.263 The most
ideal state regulations, therefore, could not touch abusive agents who did
not possess the requisite minimum contacts with the regulating state.
Federal regulation would remedy this inherent state jurisdictional
limitation by reaching into every state to govern agents nationwide.
Moreover, federal regulation would create uniformity in the law gov-
erning agents, avoiding potential jurisdictional fights between states with
distinct and perhaps inconsistent regulations.264 Because most agents
will likely have a national client base, conflicting state provisions would
create a no-win situation for agents who want to comply with both provi-
sions. A not-so-farfetched scenario postulated by a prominent sports at-
torney is fit for a law school exam: If an agent lives in Connecticut, has
an office in New York, and is seeking to represent an athlete who just
finished college in Oklahoma, was chosen by the Dallas Cowboys in the
NFL draft, and whose mother lives in Los Angeles, and the mother, son,
and prospective agent meet in California to discuss representation, which
state can properly assert jurisdiction?265 The potential substantive incon-
sistencies among regulations and the uncertainty of coverage will lead to
258. See, eg., Bad Pitches Can Cost Millions, San Francisco Examiner, July 21, 1985, at
Al, col. 3; Quick Riches and Fast Deals ofa FootballAgent, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 21,
1983, at El, col. 1; Akers Wants Agents Controlled, Austin American-Statesman, Apr. 2, 1985,
at Dl, col. 1.
259. "[I]t is well established that within Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state
authority ... ." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
260. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
263. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also supra
note 146.
264. The California and Oklahoma Statutes, for instance, conflict on whether attorneys
acting as legal counsel should be covered by their regulations. Compare supra notes 154-57
and accompanying text with supra note 182 and accompanying text.
265. Shefsky, supra note 49. Shefsky uses this hypothetical in his speeches to exemplify
the potential absurdity of state-by-state regulation. "If you're going to regulate, you might as
well regulate under the best jurisdiction, and that's federal jurisdiction." Id
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forum shopping and an adjudicative morass. Preemptive federal legisla-
tion imposing a single standard to be adjudicated in the federal courts
would avoid the chaos.
Another problem of state-by-state regulation is that, as more states
enact legislation, the sports agent will have to shoulder an intolerable
administrative and financial burden in order to comply with each state's
registration, annual renewal, and bond or insurance requirements. Since
rules such as those in Oklahoma impose burdens of time and money on
agents before they may even contact potential clients, 266 competent, ethi-
cal agents may not want to shoulder the burden for a mere chance267 of
representing the athlete. An-athlete may therefore miss the opportunity
to speak to the agent best suited to represent him because the agent may
choose not to "spend a lot of money and time just for a shot. ' 268 Instead
of protecting the athlete, a state regulation may place the athlete at a
disadvantage to those athletes in states without regulations. Preemptive
federal regulation would replace multiple application and fee require-
ments with one application and fee. Competent representatives would
not be priced out of the market and athletes would have a broader field of
agents from which to choose.
A fundamental reason for the lack of effectiveness and perceived en-
forcement authority of state regulations is that the sports agent profes-
sion is truly national in scope. The sports agent's profession exists
wherever his athlete-clients play or reside.269 Unlike an attorney, who
can essentially practice in a state in which he is not licensed to practice
by hiring a member of that state's bar to make court appearances, such a
tactic is not viable for a sports agent. Agent-to-client and agent-to-team
contacts are emphasized far too much for an agent to be able to hire
"fronts" registered in particular states to perform essential functions for
his clients. Thus, although individual state bar associations adequately
regulate without excessively burdening their members, the national, per-
son-to-person nature of the sports agent profession precludes analogous
state coverage.
Indeed, sports agents more closely resemble stockbrokers, who have
been federally regulated since 1934.270 A principal-agent relationship,
27'
266. The better athletes are literally swarmed with agents seeking representation of the
athlete. More than 100 agents contacted football star Gary Anderson during his senior year
at Arkansas. Remarks by Robert Ruxin, National Association of Academic Advisors for
Athletics 1984 Convention, Dallas, Texas (Jan. 7, 1984).
267. See, e.g., supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
268. Brinkman, supra note 69.
269. Shefsky, supra note 49. "Being an agent is certainly not a 'hang-the-shingle-on-the-
door-and-come-on-in' profession." Id.
270. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1983).
271. See W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3 (1964). A principal-
agent relationship obliges the agent to perform in the best interests of the principal. But as
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with the principal's livelihood at stake and a great potential for agent
abuse, are common to both professions. Under the Securities Exchange
Act, brokers must complete an extensive application for registration,272
conduct certain aspects of their business in a particular manner, 273 and
pass a securities examination. 274 The regulation of brokers establishes a
precedent for analogous federal regulation of the sports agents'
profession.
A final and potentially fatal drawback of state-by-state regulation is
that state laws may not pass constitutional muster. Under the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution, Congress is authorized to regu-
late interstate and foreign commerce. 275 Federal regulation of sports
agents would appear to be within the commerce power because many
agents do operate simultaneously in many different states. For state stat-
utory regulations of interstate commerce to be constitutional, they must
pass the often-cited Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., test: "Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be up-
held unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. ' 276 A state's attempt to enforce its
regulation against an agent with few but sufficient minimum contacts
with the state to merit jurisdiction-for example, representation of one
player on a team in a city in that state-may be challenged on the ground
that the law's burden on commerce outweighs its benefits to the state.277
The agent could argue that the burdens of paying registration fees, post-
ing a bond, and complying with any disclosure and filing requirements
are "clearly excessive" in relation to the state's interest in regulating his
single contract with an athlete in that state. The viability of such a con-
stitutional argument will be determined only when a state enforcement
action is challenged by a sports agent.
Even without a formal challenge to existing state regulation, states
pondering whether to enact agent regulations may informally apply the
long as the agent operates within the scope of his authority, the principal is bound by the
agent's actions. Id.
272. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4).
273. Id. § 78q(a), (e). The registered broker is required to keep his books in a specified
manner and must file a certified balance sheet and income statement annually. Id
274. S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 16 (1977).
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3.
276. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
277. At present it is somewhat unclear whether a court would examine the burden that the
state law places on an individual, or on the cumulative burden placed on all individuals regu-
lated. See Camille Corp. v. Phares, 705 F.2d 223, 229 (7th Cir. 1983) (if the law places too
great a burden on the interstate dealings of one person or entity regulated under the law, the
law can be invalid under the Pike test. But see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117,
127-28 (1978) (a law's cumulative effect on all persons covered by the law, rather than its effect
on individual persons or entities, is the relevant "burden" to examine under the Pike test).
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Pike test. If the state has no professional sports team and only fifteen or
twenty athletes would be protected by the regulation, the state may con-
clude that the expense of enforcing the law and the potential burdens on
agents would outweigh the "local benefits." Although failing to enact
regulations could be a wise economic choice for the state, the fifteen or
twenty athletes would remain unprotected from problems of agent abuse.
These athletes, in effect, would be disadvantaged in comparison to ath-
letes in states that determined that regulatory benefits outweighed regula-
tory burdens. A federal law would reach into states that have no agent
regulations.
Federal legislation would also solve the many inherent disadvan-
tages of non-legislative regulations. In contrast to NCAA and ARPA
measures, a federal statute would require, not request, registration of
agents. Unlike the NCAA and players' association provisions, a federal
measure could regulate all agents in all sports at all levels. Instead of
being forced to choose whether to comply with a players' association rule
proscribing certain conduct or with a state law provision allowing that
same conduct,278 the agent would need to look only as far as the federal
regulation and any regulatory bodies designated to implement it. In ad-
dition, the enforcement deficiencies that exist in all non-legislative regu-
lations would be eliminated by Congress' authority to impose civil and
criminal sanctions.
Ten years ago, a congressional committee, although "disturbed" by
widespread agent misconduct and ineffective attempts at regulation, put
off the federal enactment of sports agent regulation until the nature of
agent misconduct was clarified and until examples of agent malpractice
were sufficient to merit a committee recommendation for legislative ac-
tion.279 Since the federal government has failed to enact agent regula-
tion, both non-legislative and state-legislative attempts have been made
to eliminate sports agent abuses. 280 The abuses, however, remain. The
self-policing solution propounded by agents testifying before the commit-
tee2 ' and tentatively supported by the committee, 2 2 as well as the more
formal regulatory efforts, have been ineffective and mostly ignored.
Agent Mike Trope stated that he will not heed regulations unless they
278. For example, although the California law nowhere prohibits solicitation and in fact
recognizes that it will occur, the NFLPA regulation prohibits solicitation. Compare CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1537 (West Supp. 1986) with NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 94, at 16.
279. REPORT, supra note 22, at 77; see supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text.
280. Some see the regulatory efforts as too hastily conceived and enacted to be effective.
"The issue of agent abuse is so hot now that the states will pass almost anything to get legisla-
tion into print. But because the laws aren't well thought out, they may end up worsening
rather than improving the situation." Brinkman, supra note 69.
281. Hearings, supra note 16, at 290 (testimony of Jack Mills, agent); id. at 291 (testimony
of Jerry Kapstein, agent).
282. REPORT, supra note 22, at 79.
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are "laws of the United States, and you can go to prison for ten years if
you break them. ' 28 3 Frank Windegger, Texas Christian University Ath-
letic Director, has seen his athletic department suffer from the conduct of
unscrupulous agents and, recognizing the shortcoming of existing regula-
tion, feels that "regulation of agents has got to become federal law."
'284
Because agents are as "completely without bounds" 285 as they were ten
years ago, it is time for Congress to act. Time has "clarified" the nature
of agent misconduct and produced "sufficient" examples of agent mal-
practice for Congress to cure current regulatory inadequacies and to fur-
ther its committee's original objective of enacting legislation designed to
solve the problems of professional sports.
IV. The Professional Sports Agency Act of 1985
In 1982, the National Sports Lawyers Association (NSLA) began
drafting a proposed federal statute to regulate sports agents. 286 Alarmed
by the abuses threatening the profession, the NSLA recognized the need
for regulation, perceived the inadequacies of the existing state and non-
legislative measures, and set out to propose legislation at the level most
suited to solve the clearly national problem-the federal level.
28 7
Because sports represent a substantial national commercial interest
and because agents have become such a significant part of the sports en-
vironment, the NSLA planned to introduce its proposal to the United
States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
(Commerce Committee). 288 In 1985, committee member Senator Robert
Packwood informally agreed to sponsor the proposal, entitled the Profes-
sional Sports Agency Act of 1985 (PSAA), in the Commerce Committee.
When Senator Packwood was named to chair the Senate's Finance Com-
mittee, however, his new duties forced him to forego the prospective
sponsorship of the NSLA proposal. 28 9 Senator John Danforth of Mis-
souri, the chairman of the Commerce Committee, became too involved in
co-sponsoring the Professional Sports Community Protection Act290 to
283. McLeese, supra note 91, at 46.
284. Former Sports Agent Charges College Players Signed Contracts, supra note 7, at C9,
col. 3 (quoting Frank Windegger, Texas Christian University (TCU) Athletic Director). Two
TCU athletes were declared ineligible in 1987 for signing with agent Jim Abernethy before
their college eligibility had expired. Id
285. Hearings, supra note 16, at 165 (testimony of Harrison Vickers, owner, Houston
Aeros).
286. Shefsky, supra note 49.
287. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AGENCY AcT OF 1985 (1985) (drafted by the National Sports
Lawyers Association and yet to be introduced before Congress) [hereinafter PSAA]; Shefsky,
supra note 49.
288. Shefsky, supra note 49.
289. Id.
290. S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Professional Sports Community Protection Act)
(advocates restricting the relocation of sports teams).
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lend his sponsorship to the NSLA's proposed sports agent regulation. 291
With logical sponsors unavailable and "illogical" sponsors shrugging off
the sports agent problem, 292 the NSLA currently is "feeling out" Con-
gress to determine the proper time, place, and source of the PSAA's
introduction.
293
The PSAA's initial section presents strong rationales for federal leg-
islation. It points out the significant role sports play in interstate com-
merce, as well as the interstate character of the sports agent profession.
It notes that the field is susceptible to impropriety and misconduct detri-
mental both to athletes and the general public, that sports agents are not
subject to federal regulation, and that federal legislation is necessary to
control the profession and to protect the athlete.294
The PSAA hopes to accomplish this control and protection by re-
quiring that all sports agents become members of a registered "national
sports agency association. ' 295 A sports agent association may become a
"national sports agency association" under the proposal by registering
with the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) and meeting general organi-
zational and procedural requirements.
296
Unless an agent is a registered member of such an association, "it
shall be unlawful for any sports agent ... to effect any transaction re-
garding any agency contract or sports contract, or to induce the forma-
tion of any sports contract or agency contract. '29 7 The agent and all
persons associated with the agent 298 must meet the standards of training,
experience, competence, and other qualifications set by the Secretary and
291. Shefsky, supra note 49.
292. Shefsky, supra note 49. "The illogical sponsors were naively asking 'why should we
bother with legislation to help a bunch of millionaires?' They didn't and don't realize that
because of the misconduct of sports agents, a lot of these kids with million dollar contracts will
end up as poor drug addicts." Id.
293. Id. "We'll probably have to wait until the current mood of deregulation subsides."
Id.
294. PSAA, supra note 287, § 2(1)-(5).
295. Id. § 6(b). " '[Nlational sports agency association' means any association of sports
agents which has been approved by and registered with the Secretary [of Commerce] as a
national sports agency association .... " Id. § 3(5).
296. Id. § 5(a)-(b). The association's rules must be nondiscriminatory, not overly burden-
some, and designed-via procedurally proper disciplinary measures-to eliminate agent mis-
conduct. Id.
297. Id. § 6(b). " '[A]gency contract' means any oral or written contract, transaction or
arrangement, pursuant to which a person is or purports to be authorized or empowered as a
sports agent." Id. § 3(2). " 'Sports contract' means any contract, transaction or arrangement
whereby an athlete agrees to render services as a participant or player to a professional sports
team or as part of a professional sporting event." Id. § 3(12).
298. " '[A]ssociated with' means having a legal affiliation or employment relationship."
Id. § 3(3). The PSAA later indicates that "bona fide clerical workers on stated salaries" may
be not be considered persons "associated with" an agent. Id. § 6(d)(2)(G).
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the national sports agency association to which the agent applied.299 The
Secretary or the particular association may require applicants to pass an
examination before granting registration.
300
The national sports agency association will grant registration or sug-
gest denial to the Secretary, who in the latter event will make an in-
dependent registration decision, based on specified procedures and within
a certain period.301 A national sports agency association may suggest
denial if. (1) the applicant does not meet the competency standards set by
the association; (2) the applicant is not financially or operationally re-
sponsible; (3) the applicant has engaged and is likely to continue to en-
gage in acts inconsistent with the association's rules; or (4) the applicant
is subject to a statutory disqualification. In addition, a registered associa-
tion may bar a person from becoming "associated with" one of its mem-
bers if this person does not meet the association's competency
requirements or if he has engaged or is likely to engage in conduct incon-
sistent with the association's rules.
302
Before granting registration and again within six months after grant-
ing registration to a particular agent, the relevant national sports agency
association must inspect the agent's premises to determine whether the
agent will be or is conducting his business in conformity with the PSAA
rules. 30 3 A national sports agency association must follow specificity and
notice requirements to suspend a registered agent, 304 and may summarily
suspend a member who is in financial or operational difficulty.305 The
bill grants the Secretary discretion to stay such a suspension, 30 6 and the
authority, subject to certain guidelines, to censure or limit the activities
of a sports agent, or suspend or revoke an agent's registration.
30 7
The PSAA would represent a distinct improvement over existing
regulations. The most significant advantage, of course, would be its juris-
dictional breadth. Unlimited by state boundaries or player association
memberships, the PSAA would not only reach all agents, providing they
possessed minimum contacts with the United States or any of its territo-
ries or possessions, 30 8 but would also apply to clients at any professional
level, and even those in non-team sports. As a federal regulation, it
would not face the potential commerce clause restrictions that state stat-
299. Id § 6(c)(1).
300. Id. § 6(c)(2).
301. Id § 6(d)0)(A).
302. Id § 5(c)(2)-(4).
303. Id. § 6(f), (i).
304. Id § 5(d)(l)-(2).
305. Id. § 5(d)(3).
306. Id
307. Id § 7(a)-(b).
308. In actions pursuant to federal statutes, "due process requires only that a defendant in
a federal suit have minimum contacts with the United States." FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651
F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981).
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utes confront.3 9 Furthermore, the proven and ominous enforcement
power of the federal government likely would persuade even Mike
Trope310 and others similarly apathetic towards lesser regulations to heed
the PSAA's provisions. Finally, if the PSAA preempted the field of
agent regulation, thereby taking the place of all state regulations, agents
would not be faced with either the potential inconsistencies of state laws
or the financial burden of multiple registration fee and bond
requirements.
The scope of agent activities regulated by the PSAA would be much
broader than that of any of the existing regulations. While only contract
negotiators are covered by the various regulations discussed in section II,
under the PSAA, contract negotiators as well as promoters and financial
managers must register before entering into a representation contract
with an athlete.311 Thus, agents who perform all types of services would
be covered.
The PSAA's lack of an attorney exemption also reflects its broader,
more effective scope. Only attorneys whose sole service is to maintain
the athlete's funds in trust are deemed not to be engaged in "active repre-
sentation" and thus are not included under the PSAA definition of
"sports agents. ' 312 All other attorneys servicing athletes are "sports
agents" and must register and comply with the provisions of the PSAA.
Unlike the California statute, attorneys who negotiate contracts cannot
evade the PSAA by hiding behind the conveniently vague veil of "acting
as legal counsel. '313 By making the PSAA generally applicable to attor-
neys with only a minor exception, the drafters of the PSAA ensured that
all agents negotiating athlete contracts would be forced to register.
The PSAA, although an improvement over the present regulatory
schemes, does have several drawbacks. The PSAA fails to impose any
civil or criminal sanctions upon a wrongdoer and threats only revocation
or suspension of registration, 314 thereby foregoing a powerful incentive
for agent compliance. Furthermore, without a bond-posting or insurance
requirement, the PSAA provides no financial remedy for the victimized
athlete. Suspending or revoking the registration of abusive agents such
as Richard Sorkin315 or Joe Courrege 316 will not protect or satisfy an
athlete who has lost money because of the agent's misconduct.
Moreover, although the PSAA gives the Secretary and registered
national sports agency associations the authority to set "standards of
309. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
311. See PSAA, supra note 287, §§ 3(1), (2), (11), (12), 6(b).
312. Id. § 3(1), (11).
313. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
314. PSAA, supra note 287, §§ 5(d), 7.
315. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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training, experience, competence," and other appropriate qualifications,
and to administer tests, 3 17 it contains no express objective criteria and
does not require that the agent pass a registration exam. National sports
agency associations, like the players' associations and the regulating
states, will probably choose not to administer tests or make detailed
background checks if a regulatory measure does not require it. Ron Sha-
piro, sports agent and former Maryland Securities Commissioner, notes
that:
[O]bjective criteria regarding education and training are the most im-
portant components of effective regulation .... Without specific, tan-
gible standards, the regulation would be useless. There would be no
required basepoint upon which the associations could base application
denials or upon which an agent could base his conduct. Unqualified
people would, without a doubt, slip through the cracks.318
Finally, the PSAA contains no restriction on the amount of fees an
agent can collect. In fact, the proposal expressly, but inexplicably, de-
nounces any such restriction. 319 Therefore, the PSAA misses an oppor-
tunity to curb a major area of abuse-excessive fees. More fundamental
problems also may prevent the PSAA from achieving much of its poten-
tial effectiveness. First, although a court might find that the PSAA
preempts state agent regulation statutes if challenged, 320 the bill does not
contain express preemption language. Congress could expressly provide
that the PSAA preempts the field of agent regulation under the United
States Constitution's supremacy clause,321 which would automatically in-
validate all state regulations. 322 Then, having only one regulatory
317. PSAA, supra note 287, § 6(c)(1)-(2).
318. Shapiro, supra note 35. "Without objective criteria, agents will be registered but un-
prepared to provide the services that must be provided to young athletes. You'll have agents
with no college degree luring kids out of college early and agents with no financial background
taking care of athletes' finances. You need hard, no-nonsense rules." Id
319. PSAA, supra note 287, § 5(e).
320. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
321. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. "This Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id.
322. Express terms of a congressional act can preempt state action. Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 420 U.S. 519, 525, (1977). Without express preemption, the validity of state regulation
becomes less clear.
Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent to supersede state law alto-
gether may be found from a "scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it," because "the
Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject . . .
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (citations omit-
ted). Even a member of the Supreme Court, however, has recognized that this standard is less
than clear:
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated formula that
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scheme to follow, agents would be freed of multiple, burdensome, and
confusing state legislation.
A final possible drawback of the bill is its unnecessary organiza-
tional bias. In drafting the PSAA, the NSLA, an organization of sports
attorneys with the high standards and foresight to push for federal legis-
lation, envisioned that organizations such as itself would become national
sports agency associations and would efficiently bear the burden of regu-
lating agents. Although federally supervised regulation by agent organi-
zations would feature greater clarity, power, and breadth than any
existing regulatory measures, federal legislation of sports agents would be
more effective if the regulators were not also the ones to be regulated.
Although the PSAA provides that one director of each association must
be a non-agent, 323 agent directors would select this lone non-agent direc-
tor. Even if truly concerned with the interests of athletes, this represen-
tative could be drowned out by the voices and votes of agent directors.
Organizations more concerned with the protection of athletes would pro-
vide more stringent enforcement of federal regulations than those organi-
zations, such as NSLA, which are primarily interested in advancing the
goals of their agent members. Players' associations, with their jurisdic-
tional and enforcement inadequacies eliminated through federal legisla-
tion, would represent a more properly interested body to implement the
federal sports agent regulation.
V. The Best Answer to the Call for Regulation
A preemptive federal statute placing the bulk of its substantive im-
plementation on players' associations would represent the optimum regu-
lation of sports agents. This ideal federal statute would contain only the
universally applicable and most significant substantive provisions for reg-
ulating agents, leaving the detailed rules for each players' association to
set. To protect all athletes, federal law would require each sport's play-
ers' association, including associations in individual sports, 324 to submit
their detailed regulatory schemes for approval by the Secretary of Com-
merce. A scheme approved by the Secretary would achieve the status of
federal law because violations of these measures would constitute viola-
tions of the federal statute.3 25 Because players' associations are com-
Congress by occupying the field has excluded from it all state legislation. Every Act
of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before
we can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it
by the Constitution.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting).
323. PSAA, supra note 287, § 5(b)(3).
324. Associations such as the Professional Golfers Association and the Professional Bow-
lers Association, therefore, would have to submit plans. "There is just as much potential for
abuse in individual sports as there is in team sports." Sobel, supra note 184.
325. By equating violations of players' association rules with violations of federal law,
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prised of the most direct victims of agent abuse, the athletes, they would
be far more interested in rigid enforcement of the regulation than would
the national sports agency association proposed in the PSAA, comprised
principally of sports agents.
Equally important as the players' associations' incentive to zealously
enforce the regulation would be their ability to shape their particular,
now federally supported rules to meet the unique problems existing in
their respective sports. 326 Unlike the California and Oklahoma statutes,
this measure would reflect the realization that markedly different sports
make agents an "extremely diverse group" for which it is consequently
"very hard to set exact standards. ' 327 In addition to providing enforce-
ment by interested parties and the flexibility to respond to sport-specific
problems, the placement of the proposal's administrative burden on the
regulation's athletes who benefit from the regulation rather than on tax-
payers renders such a decentralized legislative scheme the most efficient
means by which to regulate agents.
The clout of a federal statute is attractive for a number of reasons.
First, of course, the threat of criminal sanctions will deter misconduct
more effectively than would the less ominous but necessarily limited
"revocation or suspension" threats used by players' associations acting
without federal authority. Second, a preemptive federal statute would
mean that the statute and the players' association measures approved
pursuant to the statute would constitute the unambiguous extent of agent
regulation. The preemption of state measures would eliminate the confu-
sion and multiple burdens that plague the most ethical agents in today's
unorganized regulatory state.
Under this scheme, the Secretary of Commerce would retain a cen-
tralized eye on the regulations to ensure that rules of one association did
not conflict with rules of another association. Thus, agents representing
athlete clients in more than one sport would not have to choose-as they
may have to currently, without the benefit of congressionally maintained
consistency-which of several conflicting provisions to follow. Finally,
because agents would be required to meet threshold criteria established
by the Secretary of Commerce to become eligible for registration by re-
spective players' associations, and because players' associations would be
required to submit updated lists of their registered agents to the Secre-
tary, the Secretary would possess a centralized list of approved agents.
Congress would parallel its action in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whereby violations
of SEC regulations represented violations of the federal act. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1983).
326. "Some sports, such as baseball, have problems based on the young age at which ath-
letes get agents or on unique free agent compensation structures. Other sports, such as football
when the USFL (United States Football League) was alive, have problems based on competing
leagues. Different problems demand different solutions." Sobel, supra note 184.
327. Hearings, supra note 16, at 282 (testimony of Martin Blackman, agent).
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Consequently, athletes would need to look at only one list to determine
the registration status of prospective agents.
Substantively, the federal statute proposed here would largely paral-
lel the PSAA, with the major difference being the replacement of "na-
tional sports agency associations" with "players' associations." In
adapting the PSAA to a players' association base instead of an agent
association base, players' associations in each sport would be required,
within a certain period of time, for example, six months after the passage
of the federal statute, to submit an agent regulation plan to the Secretary
of Commerce for approval. If not approved initially, the Secretary and
the players' association would work together to adopt an acceptable plan
within an additional period of time, for example, six additional months.
The statute's approval process, then, would require that an approved
agent regulation plan be established in each sport 32 8 within a relatively
short period of time after the statute's passage.
To gain the necessary approval by the Secretary, a players' associa-
tion plan would be required to include certain standard provisions. The
association's regulation, for example, would have to treat attorney and
non-attorney agents identically. Prohibiting any attorney exemption
would prevent the discrimination against non-attorneys and the wide-
spread neglect of regulation that is now occurring in California. 329 The
proposed statute would also require the players' association to set a maxi-
mum fee percentage that an agent could collect from an athlete-client,
with the amount not exceeding ten percent. Such a fee restriction would
prevent excessive fees while allowing leeway under the ten percent maxi-
mum in which players' associations could set different rates to reflect the
varying levels of service that agents provide for their clients. 330 The pro-
posal would also require the players' association to include a prohibition
against "buying" an athlete's representation via material lures. Each
players' association also would have to expressly prohibit agents from
placing themselves in possible conflict of interest situations. 331 Finally,
players' association regulations would be required to cover agents and all
types of athletes at all levels-from rookie to veteran-of the sport.
Under penalty of criminal sanctions, the statute would compel
agents to register with a sport's players' association before representing
an athlete in that sport. Unlike the proposed PSAA, the agent would
face inflexible objective standards before attaining status as a registered
agent. Threshold criteria set by the Secretary of Commerce would be
328. The Secretary of Commerce would determine what activity constitutes a "sport."
329. See supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
330. Players' associations perhaps would want to impose lower maximum fees for types of
agents who need to spend little time serving their clients. "There are a bunch of different kinds
of agents out there-money handlers, investors, negotiators, marketers-and they by no means
spend equal amounts of time working with their clients." Shapiro, supra note 35.
331. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
REGULATION OF SPORTS AGENTS
required for all agents: (1) educational experience of at least a college
degree; (2) experience and certification, if appropriate, in the specialized
areas in which they will participate as an agent (an investment advisor,
for instance, would need to be registered under federal securities laws);
3 32
and (3) passage of an examination that would include sections regarding
professional ethics and the financial and psychological333 peculiarities of
the sports world. In addition, players' associations would be permitted
to require that agents meet further reasonable criteria as prerequisites to
registration. These standards would facilitate realistically attainable
levels of competency in the sports agent field. It would certainly not be
too much to ask a fiduciary responsible for potentially millions of his
clients' dollars to have graduated from college, to be certifiably trained in
his field, and to pass a relevant examination.
To offset the cost of administering the examinations and otherwise
implementing the agent regulation plan, agents would be required to pay
small registration fees to the players' associations to which they applied.
Since "most agents represent athletes in only two or three sports at the
most," 334 the financial burden on agents from these fees would be mini-
mal. The Secretary of Commerce would receive a small percentage of all
fees collected by the players' associations to pay for the Secretary's mini-
mal administrative role in the regulatory scheme.
Two final statutory provisions, absent from the PSAA, would be
necessary to optimize the statute's effect. First, to provide the athlete
with a source for relief while not overburdening the agent, the agent
should be required to either post a $50,000 bond or to possess $50,000
worth of liability insurance. Placing this requirement in the federal stat-
ute and expressly precluding players' associations from imposing similar
bond or insurance requirements would save the agent from having to
post a bond or buy insurance for each association with which he plans to
register. Aspiring agents would not be financially dissuaded from enter-
ing the profession, a problem that currently results from the multiple
state bond or insurance requirements 335 or could occur with the imposi-
tion of multiple association bond or insurance requirements. Moreover,
because possession of the requisite amount of liability insurance would
satisfy the federal statutory requirement, many attorneys or securities
332. "Too many [players] are having their contracts negotiated by people who have never
negotiated contracts before or are investing money with people who have never invested
before." Shapiro, supra note 35.
333. "Many agents come into the business not knowing how to help the athlete through
the tough times. Sports is a stressful business and the best agents are those that can make sure
the athlete is a whole person-financially and psychologically-when he retires." Id
334. Moorad, supra note 50.
335. To comply with only the currently existing state regulations, agents must post bonds
totalling $125,000. See supra notes 141 & 174 and accompanying text.
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brokers who already possess such insurance would bear no additional
statutorily imposed economic burden.
A final statutory provision would expressly preempt, and thereby
invalidate, state regulations. As noted previously, 336 such preemption
would clear the regulatory field of numerically burdensome and poten-
tially inconsistent measures. Express preemption would make it clear to
agents and athletes that agents can operate under only one regulatory
umbrella.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, the recent increase in athletes' salaries and notoriety
has attracted some incompetent and unethical people into the sports
agent profession. Without obstacles to getting into the profession and
without enforced rules to follow once they become agents, unqualified
athlete representatives are finding athletes easy prey for abusive, self-
serving tactics. Non-legislative regulations by ARPA, the NCAA, and
various players' associations lack the scope and enforcement power to
meaningfully attack the problem. Legislative regulations adopted by
California and Oklahoma, which are hampered by limitations of jurisdic-
tion, an overly burdensome multiplicative effect, and specific provisional
deficiencies, have been unabashedly ignored by agents.
Preemptive federal legislation is necessary to solve the current regu-
latory inadequacies and to cure the epidemic of agent misconduct. A
federal measure could erase the jurisdictional ambiguities and substantive
inconsistencies of existing regulation while possessing the enforcement
power of federal regulation. Even agents testifying before the House of
Representatives ten years ago, despite their pleas for self-regulation, felt
that "[i]f there were some kind of regulation," the ideal measure "would
be uniformly administered by the Federal Government. '337 Unfortu-
nately, a proposal for federal legislation drafted by the National Sports
Lawyers Association has encountered congressional bureaucracy; its pro-
gress towards enactment consequently has stalled. Similar in many re-
spects to the National Sports Lawyers Association plan, the optimum
regulation of sports agents would feature a federal statute which, though
containing universally significant substantive provisions, would leave reg-
ulatory implementation to the players' associations of the various sports.
Able to reflect sport-specific idiosyncracies and interested in protecting
their athlete members, these players' associations would benefit from fed-
eral enforcement power. Combining the advantages of centralized and
sport-specific regulation, this federal regulatory umbrella would stand
the best chance of repelling the current rain of agent abuse.
336. See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
337. Hearings, supra note 16, at 291 (testimony of Jerry Kapstein, agent).
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